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Taxation, Non-Tax Revenue and Democracy: New Evidence Using New 
Cross-Country Data 
 
Wilson Prichard, Paola Salardi and Paul Segal 
 
 
Summary 
 
A large body of cross-country econometric research has investigated the possibility of a 
political resource curse, by which access to extensive natural resources reduces the extent 
of democracy and accountability. However, this literature has been plagued by problematic 
data and correspondingly inappropriate model specification. Dominant theories of the political 
resource curse focus on the political consequences of differences in the composition of 
government revenue, with greater reliance on non-tax revenue undermining democracy. 
However, most studies do not actually test this relationship: owing to the poor quality of 
government revenue data, they have focused instead on the impact of total resource income 
on democracy – a reasonable, but imperfect, approximation of the actual theory. Meanwhile, 
the robustness of those few studies that have focused on government revenue specifically is 
undermined by poor data quality. We overcome this problem by drawing on the newly-
created ICTD Government Revenue Dataset, which dramatically improves the quality of 
existing data and allows us to test directly the connection between the composition of 
government revenue and democracy. Employing this new data we re-test the most 
compelling econometric approaches from the existing literature, finding support for the 
existence of a political resource curse. 
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Introduction 
 
The past decade has witnessed a regular stream of cross-country econometric research into 
the political resource curse, which proposes that governments that rely more heavily on 
revenue from natural resources1 are less likely to be democratic and accountable to their 
citizens. Most research has reported a negative relationship between natural resource 
production and democracy (Andersen and Ross 2014; Aslaksen 2010; Ross 2001). 
However, a handful of studies have questioned the robustness of these findings (Haber and 
Menaldo 2011; Alexeev and Conrad 2009; Dunning 2008; Herb 2005), while several studies 
have focused instead on the impact of resource wealth on regime durability rather than levels 
of democracy per se (Smith 2004; Morrison 2009; Wright et al. 2013).  
 
These studies have included the progressive implementation of more sophisticated 
econometric methods, as well as the development of improved data on the annual value of 
resource production across countries – referred to here as ‘resource income’. However, while 
these studies have made valuable contributions, they have often paid insufficient attention to 
basic questions about data quality, model specification and the sensitivity of results to 
alternative econometric models. We correspondingly seek to go back to basics by drawing 
on better data and a more inclusive set of econometric tests in order to present more 
theoretically and empirically robust results. 
 
Central to our approach is an effort to specify and test the theoretical relationship of interest 
more clearly. The most prominent theories of the political resource curse are ultimately 
theories about the connections between the composition of government revenue and political 
outcomes. Government reliance on non-tax revenue, primarily from natural resources, is 
expected to reduce the quality of democracy and accountability by weakening state-society 
links, facilitating government investments in patronage and repression, and driving expanded 
political corruption. Meanwhile, reliance on tax revenue may have a conversely positive 
impact on governance by providing the state with stronger incentives to bargain with their 
citizens over how public revenue is used (Moore 1998).  
 
However, while theory focuses on the extent of government revenue from tax and non-tax 
sources, most existing studies have, in fact, tested the relationship between resource income 
and democracy (Wiens et al. forthcoming; Haber and Menaldo 2011; Aslaksen 2010). While 
resource revenue and resource income are, of course, closely related, the precise 
relationship varies significantly across countries, while tests that focus on resource income 
take no account of differences across counties in levels of non-resource taxation. The 
implication is that most existing studies have tested a reasonable, but ultimately imperfect, 
approximation of the theoretical relationship of interest – a fact implicitly or explicitly 
acknowledged in several recent studies (Haber and Menaldo 2011; Wiens et al. 
forthcoming). While a handful of studies have attempted to focus directly on the composition 
of government revenue, the success of these efforts has been undermined by their reliance 
on incomplete and problematic data that raises major questions about the robustness of the 
results (Ross 2004; Morrison 2009).2  
 
The central contribution of this paper thus lies in drawing on the newly-created International 
Centre for Tax and Development Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD), which allows 
us to construct measures of the composition of government revenue that are relatively 
complete, accurate and theoretically appropriate. The new dataset allows us to distinguish 
																																																								
1  In this context, natural resources generally refers, more specifically, to non-renewable natural resources that generate 
significant economic rent – primarily oil production and, to a lesser extent, mining revenue. 
2  See Prichard et al. (2014) for a fuller discussion of these data limitations. 
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consistently between tax revenue, which is defined exclusive of natural resource revenue,3 
and non-tax revenue, which is dominated by natural resource revenue, while also including 
other forms of non-tax revenue. From these two components we then construct a composite 
measure of tax reliance, which measures the share of government revenue secured through 
non-resource taxation. The tax revenue and non-tax revenue variables closely mirror the 
core analytical distinction of interest: between ‘earned’ revenue, which is expected to lead to 
increased accountability through bargaining between government and citizens, and 
‘unearned’ revenue, which is expected to reinforce autocracy (Moore 1998).4  
 
With this data in hand, we test the relationship between government revenue and democracy 
by employing several of the most compelling econometric approaches from the existing 
literature: Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), Mean Group estimators (MG), Random 
and Fixed Effects (FE) Logit and Error Correction Models (ECMs). This wide-ranging 
approach is a response to the proliferation of alternative econometric strategies in the 
literature, and corresponding concerns about comparability and robustness. In the presence 
of methodological uncertainty, we view the transparent implementation of several 
complementary, but individually imperfect, estimation strategies as the most compelling 
approach. 
 
We find strong evidence of a political resource curse across all the econometric estimation 
strategies. Our composite measure of tax reliance is positively associated with democracy in 
all specifications, and achieves statistical significance in the strong majority of them. When 
we disaggregate our measure of tax reliance into its component parts – total tax revenue as 
a share of GDP and total non-tax revenue as a share of GDP – we find consistent evidence 
that increases in non-tax revenue have a negative impact on democracy. Critically, the 
magnitude of these effects is substantial, with countries securing the majority of income from 
non-tax revenue dramatically less likely to be democratic. The results linking increased 
taxation to democracy are significantly more mixed – though sometimes positive and 
significant – which we attribute to the greater complexity of the hypothesised causal 
relationship. Finally, while the results offer clear support for the existence of a political 
resource curse, we also intentionally highlight some sensitivity of particular results to 
changes in model specification and estimation strategies. This echoes Acemoglu et al. 
(2008), among others, who highlight the difficulty of estimating complex political relationships 
using cross-country econometric methods. This reinforces the importance of carefully 
exploring the sensitivity of key results. 
 
The paper proceeds in seven parts. The next section presents a brief review of the relevant 
literature, focusing on going back to basics in ensuring appropriate data to test the theoretical 
propositions of interest directly. The second section presents the new data and the 
construction of the revenue variables. The third section presents the empirical strategy, 
reviewing the rationale for a range of alternative econometric models. The fourth section 
presents the core results, and the fifth section presents robustness checks. The sixth section 
offers a discussion of the core results, including how best to interpret the relatively 
ambiguous results linking tax collection and democracy. The final section concludes. 
 
 
																																																								
3  As described in greater detail below, earlier government revenue datasets frequently conflate resource and non-
resource sources of taxation, despite them being analytically distinct in relation to theories of the resource curse. 
4  While the data does not allow for further disaggregating non-tax revenue into its natural resource and non-resource 
components, we view this is a minor problem: most of the variation in non-tax revenue is driven by natural resource 
revenue, many types of non-tax revenue are analytically similar to natural resource revenue, and, most critically, the 
inclusion of any ‘tax-like’ elements in the non-tax category will bias our analysis against finding a significant relationship 
between non-tax revenue and democracy. 
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1  Going back to basics: model specification, 
data and methods  
 
Studies of the political resource curse propose that countries that rely more heavily on 
revenue from natural resources are less likely to be democratic than those that rely more 
heavily on tax revenue. This is most commonly attributed to two related, but distinct, causal 
mechanisms. On one hand, governments that rely heavily on tax revenue are expected to be 
forced to bargain with mobile taxpayers, conceding greater accountability and democracy in 
exchange for tax revenue (Levi 1988). On the other hand, governments with access to 
captive sources of non-tax revenue, primarily from natural resources, will be empowered to 
resist political opposition through repression or through expanded public spending and 
patronage. Ulfelder (2007) and others refer to these alternative processes as the ‘demand-
side’ and ‘supply-side’ of the political resource curse respectively. 
 
While these ideas were initially grounded in country-level studies of politics in resource-rich 
states, the past decade in particular has seen the rapid proliferation of cross-country 
econometric tests. Beginning with Ross (2001), most of these studies report the expected 
negative relationship between dependence on natural resources and the level of democracy. 
These studies variously measure natural resource dependence by the share of natural 
resources in exports, the value of natural resource production as a share of GDP, the annual 
value of natural resource production in absolute terms, and the overall stock of natural 
resources (Wantchekon 2002; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Tsui 2010; Aslaksen 2010; 
Ramsay 2011; Ross 2012; Andersen and Ross 2014). Smith (2004) and Morrison (2009) 
make the slightly different argument that natural resource wealth may increase regime 
durability in both autocracies and democracies, though Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) and 
Wiens et al. (forthcoming) contend that natural resources increase authoritarian durability, 
while having little effect on democracies.  
 
There have been several challenges to these findings. Herb (2005) reports that the negative 
association between resource wealth and accountability disappears if GDP – which is 
expected to be an important determinant of democracy – is calculated exclusive of natural 
resource wealth. Dunning (2008) argues that the political resource curse does not hold 
where levels of inequality are high, as resource wealth may reduce opposition to democracy 
among elites by reducing the need for redistributive taxation. The most high profile challenge 
to the existence of a political resource curse has come from Haber and Menaldo (2011), who 
constructed an extensive new cross-country dataset of national resource income dating back 
to 1800, and report no consistent support for the existence of a political resource curse. 
However, these new results quickly elicited a response from Andersen and Ross (2014), who 
contend – using the same data – that evidence of the political resource curse reappears if 
analysis is restricted to the period after 1980, and if the impact of resource wealth is allowed 
to occur over a period of three or five years.  
 
While recent years have thus seen the proliferation of econometric studies, employing 
progressively more sophisticated econometric techniques, this increasing complexity has 
overshadowed persistent problems related to data and model specification. We thus 
emphasise a need to go back to basics in ensuring a solid foundation for applying 
progressively more complex econometric approaches. The most prominent theories of the 
political resource curse focus on the political implications of differences in the composition of 
government revenue, rather than on the implications of the total value of resource production 
(resource income). A government that is able to capture extensive revenue from the 
exploitation of natural resources within its borders will be able to spend that revenue on 
patronage and repression, while it will have less need to bargain with taxpayers. Critically, 
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the same effects will not hold true if there is extensive resource production, but only a small 
proportion of resource rent is captured by the government as resource revenue.5  
 
However, despite this theoretical focus on the composition of government revenue, most 
studies have focused on measures of the total value of natural resource production – 
resource income (Dunning 2008; Ramsay 2011; Ross 2012; Wiens et al. forthcoming; 
Aslaksen 2010; Haber and Menaldo 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ross 2001; Smith 
2004; Ulfelder 2007). While the level of natural resource income is an important determinant 
of government resource revenue, this relationship is highly variable across countries and 
over time.6 Tellingly, Wiens et al. (forthcoming) explicitly note that a measure of government 
revenue from natural resources would be theoretically preferable to their reliance on a 
measure of resource income as a share of GDP. 
 
However, studies relying on measures of government revenue have remained rare, and their 
analysis somewhat unconvincing, owing to the inadequacy of cross-country government 
revenue data. Haber and Menaldo (2011) employ the best measure of fiscal reliance, which 
is measured as the share of natural resource revenue in total government revenue, but 
employ data for a sample of only eighteen resource-dependent countries. Meanwhile, earlier 
studies by Ross (2001), Herb (2005) and Morrison (2009) have relied on data from the IMF 
and World Bank, both of which are highly incomplete and widely understood to include 
important inaccuracies for analytical purposes, thus casting doubt on the robustness of those 
results (Prichard et al. 2014). Against this background, the central contribution of this study 
lies in introducing the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset, which contains more complete 
and accurate data on the composition of government revenue. This allows us to test the 
impact of changes in the composition of government revenue on levels of democracy and 
accountability, thus capturing the core theoretical propositions underpinning the political 
resource curse. 
 
Finally, a brief note is necessary about our reliance on measures of the relative, rather than 
absolute, extent of revenue from non-tax sources. In recent years a variety of studies of the 
political and economic impacts of natural resources have focused on the absolute level of 
natural resource income, rather than measuring resource dependence as a share of GDP or 
of total government revenue. This decision has been grounded in plausible methodological 
concerns about endogeneity: low-income countries may be highly dependent on resource 
revenue not because the resource sector is large, but because the rest of the economy is 
small and tax collection is weak (Dunning 2008; Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008).  
 
However, while this implies that relative measures of resource dependence may be 
endogenous with respect to measures of economic performance (such as long-run economic 
growth), it applies to accountability and democracy only if accountability and democracy are 
themselves determined by economic performance. This is at best contentious, and we find, 
like Acemoglu et al. (2008), that this is not the case. Moreover, the solution is worse than the 
original problem: employing a measure of the absolute, rather than the relative, level of 
resource income fundamentally distorts the research question.7 Theories of the political 
resource curse are explicitly arguments about the extent of non-tax government revenue 
																																																								
5  Of course, the value of resource production may still be relevant to alternative development outcomes. High levels of 
resource income may undermine economic growth or increase the risk of conflict, irrespective of the ability of the 
government to collect revenue from resource production (e.g. van der Ploeg 2011; Humphreys 2005). However, these 
outcomes are relatively distinct from the causal arguments that are the core focus here and in the literature on the 
political resource curse. 
6  These differences may arise, among others, from differences in the characteristics of the resources and costs of 
extraction, in the ownership structure of resource companies, in national tax policies, or in the effectiveness of tax 
enforcement. Illustratively, Haber and Menaldo (2011) construct a measure of ‘fiscal reliance’ – that is, the share of 
nature resource revenue in total government revenue – for a subset of 18 countries, and it has a correlation of only 0.65 
with levels of resource income in the same countries (Wiens et al. forthcoming). 
7  It is equally worth noting that reliance on the absolute size of the resource sector does not eliminate the risk of endogeneity, 
as resource discoveries and exploitation are also more likely in more developed countries. 
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relative to other sources of revenue, and the overall size of the economy (Wiens et al. 
forthcoming). The resource curse is premised on the idea that access to resource wealth will 
alter the incentives and behaviour of political leaders and citizens. The size of these incentive 
effects should, in turn, depend on the relative, rather than absolute, size of resource revenue.  
 
 
2  Data and variables 
 
The ICTD Government Revenue Dataset has several key advantages relative to earlier 
government revenue datasets, which are summarised here and described in additional detail 
in Prichard et al. (2014). Previous research has relied primarily on data from the IMF and 
World Bank, both of which are plagued by missing data (Ross 2004; Morrison 2009), or on 
datasets that offer relatively more complete data coverage for only a very limited subset of 
countries (Haber and Menaldo 2011; Baskaran and Bigsten 2013). By contrast, the ICTD 
GRD covers 188 countries and a total of 3,342 country-year observations during the period 
1990-2010. This includes almost 70 per cent more observations for developing countries 
than the IMF Government Finance Statistics during the same period.8 Whereas most 
previous datasets have focused exclusively on central government data, the ICTD GRD 
employs general government data where available, in order to avoid underestimating 
revenue collection in federal states.9 The analysis here focuses on data beginning in 1990, 
as it offers the most complete data coverage, though the results are robust to employing 
earlier but less complete data as well.  
 
At least as important are substantial improvements in data accuracy, particularly in relation to 
the classification of tax and non-tax revenue.10 The key analytical distinction for our purposes 
is between what Moore (1998) terms earned income, which is collected from citizens and 
expected to prompt bargaining and accountability, and unearned income, which is collected 
from narrow and relatively captive sources, and is expected to make governments more 
autonomous from citizens. Broadly speaking, most domestic taxes can be thought of as 
earned revenue, while revenue collected from natural resource operations are more akin to 
unearned revenue.  
 
Unfortunately, this analytical distinction is frequently violated within existing international 
datasets. In general, governments collect revenue from resource companies through two 
broad channels, corporate taxes and various types of royalties, alongside a more widely 
varied range of smaller taxes and levies.11 Motivated by an accounting logic, international 
databases frequently group corporate taxes on resource firms along with all other types of 
																																																								
8  This excludes a small set of observations that are excluded from the analysis owing to: (a) an inability to deal effectively 
with resource revenue; (b) highly irregular data resulting, most often, from hyperinflation; and (c) data for years in which 
there were exceptionally large fluctuations in the composition of government revenue during transitions from centrally-
planned economies. These exclusions are described in detail in Prichard et al. (2014), while the results reported here 
are in any case robust to including countries transitioning from centrally-planned economies.  
9  In principle this approach risks creating a new set of distortions by ignoring sub-national revenue sources in highly 
centralised countries. However, in practice sub-national tax revenue generally accounts for less than 5% of total tax 
revenue, and often a significantly smaller proportion, in highly centralised (generally low-income) countries (Bird 2011). 
As such, any distortion of this type is likely to be negligible, whereas the distortions implied by relying solely on central 
government data are potentially large. Indeed, we find that the results to follow are more robust, and more in line with 
expectations, when relying on the dataset that merges central and general government data. 
10  Aside from improvements in the classification of tax and non-tax revenue, greater accuracy results from systematic 
comparison of alternative sources to identify problematic observations and from standardising the recording of social 
security contributions across countries and over time (Prichard et al. 2014). 
11  For the sake of simplicity, this term is used very broadly to include royalties as such, profit sharing, the auction values of 
exploration and extraction rights, and any other legal mechanism of transferring natural resource rents to the 
government. 
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domestic tax revenue, while royalties are classified as non-tax revenue.12 However, from a 
political economy perspective, taxes on resource firms are no different from royalties, and 
both are analytically distinct from other types of tax revenue. The result is that the ‘taxes’ and 
‘non-tax revenue’ categories in international databases often do not correspond to the 
theoretical quantities of interest, earned and unearned income. 
 
Against this background, the key innovation of the ICTD GRD lies in consistently 
distinguishing the resource and non-resource components of tax revenue.13 This makes it 
possible to construct variables that are more analytically accurate. The first variable captures 
total tax collection as a share of GDP (tottax) and, critically, is exclusive of resource revenue, 
thus making it a more consistent proxy for earned income. The second variable captures 
total non-tax revenue as a share of GDP (totnontax), and is a proxy for unearned income. 
This variable incorporates all revenue from natural resource production, be it formally 
labelled royalties, taxes or any alternative, as well as additional non-tax revenue, including 
revenue from state enterprises and licences. We exclude aid grants from non-tax revenue 
owing both to problems of data availability and accuracy, and reflecting significant evidence 
elsewhere that aid affects government incentives differently to natural resource rents.14 
Finally, we are able to combine these two variables to construct a measure of tax reliance 
(tax_rel), which measures the share of non-resource tax revenue in total government 
revenue.15 All our econometric tests first look at the impact of tax reliance (tax_rel) on 
democracy, following earlier studies (Ross 2004). We then disaggregate tax reliance into its 
component parts, tottax and totnontax, in order to attempt to disentangle the respective roles 
of taxation and non-tax revenue in shaping outcomes.16 
 
It would, in principle, be desirable to disaggregate non-tax revenue into its resource and non-
resource components, in order to focus attention separately on the political implications of, 
respectively, government revenue from natural resources and all other sources of non-tax 
revenue. In practice, however, available data sources to not allow for making this distinction 
consistently. This does not call any of the core results into question, but does result in some 
ambiguity about whether our results are capturing the impact on democracy of natural 
resource revenue specifically, or of non-tax revenue more generally. 
 
At a minimum it is clear that our results are driven primarily by natural resource revenue, 
which comprises the vast majority of variation in total non-tax revenue. All the countries in 
the analysis that collect more than 10 per cent of GDP in non-tax revenue are major resource 
producers, among which non-tax revenue averages 25 per cent of GDP and reaches as high 
as 60 per cent of GDP. The impact of other sources of non-tax revenue is, by contrast, more 
ambiguous. Several of the non-resource components of non-tax revenue in developing 
																																																								
12  This is not universally the case, as taxes on resource firms are sometimes classified as non-tax revenue, while 
classification is more unpredictable and varied in countries in which resource extraction is controlled by state-owned 
firms.  
13  This process draws primarily on IMF Article IV reports. Occasional country-year observations for which this distinction 
cannot be successfully drawn are excluded from the analysis.  
14  With respect to data, it is frequently impossible to distinguish ‘on budget’ grants – which would be the quantity of interest 
– from other types of aid, making it impossible to construct a truly consistent and comparable measure of aid revenue 
across countries. Analytically, aid is expected to have distinct governance implications owing to the fact that it is 
frequently targeted for specific purposes and is tied to external monitoring, conditionality and technical assistance 
(Collier 2006). Empirically, this intuition is confirmed by evidence that natural resource revenue leads to sharply reduced 
domestic tax collection, while the same is not true of aid grants (Bornhorst et al. 2008; Morrissey et al. 2014). While 
Morrison (2009) includes aid revenue in his measure of non-tax revenue, we are sceptical of both the precision of the 
data and the analytical appropriateness of grouping these alternative revenue sources.  
15  Mathematically, tax_rel = tottax / (tottax+totnontax) 
16  In recent years it has been increasingly recognised that GDP is substantially underestimated in many developing 
countries owing to infrequent GDP rebasing, with a resultant overestimation of tax and revenue measured as a share of 
GDP (Jerven 2013; Prichard et al. 2014). To some extent this offers an argument in favour of the tax_rel variable, as it 
is unaffected by any potential underestimation of the results. At a minimum, tax_rel offers an important robustness 
check in light of concerns about GDP figures. The results employing tottax and totnontax could potentially be affected 
by underestimation of GDP, though reliance on within country estimators reduces this risk. 
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countries share at least some features associated with unearned revenue, most notably from 
state investment funds, state monopolies and enterprises, or revenue from fishing or forestry 
licences.17 However, other revenue sources included in non-tax revenue involve at least 
some element of bargaining with citizens, as with user fees. It is possible that non-resource 
types of non-tax revenue have a negative impact on democracy similar to that of resource 
revenue, but we cannot isolate this relationship. With that said, the inclusion of more ‘tax-like’ 
elements of non-tax revenue is expected to bias our results against finding evidence of a 
political resource curse, thus eliminating any concern that the conflation of different types of 
non-tax revenue is leading to misleadingly significant results.18  
 
Our primary dependent variable is democracy, which is constructed by employing the Polity2 
measure of democracy from the Polity IV dataset, and normalising it to the range 0 to 100 
(Marshall et al. 2012). This follows the dominant trend in the literature, as the polity measure 
of procedural democracy is reliable and readily available, while democracy is a useful proxy 
for the broader quality of accountability and governance. In most of our results we adopt a 
similar set of control variables to those employed in recent work by Haber and Menaldo 
(2011). Despite sceptical recent econometric evidence (Acemoglu et al. 2008), the most 
widely-cited predictor of accountability remains national income per capita, and we 
correspondingly include a measure of log GDP per capita (lgdp), drawn from the World 
Economic Outlook database, in all our core regression results.19 We additionally control for 
population size (pop, from the World Development Indicators (WDI)), the occurrence of 
violent conflict (Civil_War, which we draw from Haber and Menaldo [2011] and extend to 
2010 using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) and the regional diffusion of democracy 
(Regional_Dem_Diffuse, constructed from Polity2 data).20 We also include a measure of 
annual economic growth per capita (growthpc, from WDI) in our logit regressions, in order to 
mirror the controls employed by Wiens et al. (forthcoming). 
 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 present simple correlations between average values over the period 1990-
2010 of our dependent variable, democracy, and our three alternative revenue measures: 
Tax_rel (tax reliance), Tottax (total tax revenue) and Totnontax (total non-tax revenue). The 
figures are based on a final total of 2,866 observations across 159 countries, reflecting the 
overlapping data coverage offered by the dependent and independent variables.  
 
 
  
																																																								
17  Morrison (2009) has previously argued, though on the basis of questionable empirical data, that the different 
components of non-tax revenue are likely to have similar implications for regime stability. 
18  Illustratively, the highest levels of non-tax revenue in the dataset, other than in oil-producing countries, occur in OECD 
countries.  
19  We rely on the WEO GDP figure because it is the same figure employed in calculating the shares of government 
revenue in GDP in the ICTD dataset, as described in Prichard et al. (2014). 
20  Haber and Menaldo (2011) also employ a control for global democratic diffusion, but we do not include it in our core 
results as it should be captured by our time dummies and is never significant when we experiment with its inclusion. 
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Figure 1 Relationship between tax reliance and polity using country averages, 1990-
2010  
	  
Source: Authors’ computations using ICTD GRD (2014). Data from 1990, using period averages for each country in the dataset. 
 
Figure 2 Relationship between total tax revenue and polity using country averages, 
1990-2010  
	  
Source: Authors’ computations using ICTD GRD (2014). Data from 1990, using period averages for each country in the dataset. 
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Figure 3: Polity vs. total non-tax revenue 
	  
Source: Authors’ computations using ICTD GRD (2014). Data from 1990, using period averages for each country in the dataset. 
 
The broad patterns in the descriptive data are as expected: countries that are more reliant on 
tax revenue and less reliant on non-tax revenue tend to be more accountable. Particularly 
striking are patterns among resource producers. Looking at Figure 3, there are eighteen 
countries21 that have collected an average of at least 13 per cent of GDP in non-tax revenue. 
If we define democracy very liberally, as a country with a score of at least 50 (out of 100) on 
our adjusted polity variable,22 only two countries in the group – Botswana and Timor Leste – 
have, on average, been democracies during the same period, as compared to half of all 
developing countries for which we have data. Focusing on Figure 1, the pattern is even more 
stark: of twenty-nine countries23 with levels of tax reliance below 60 per cent – that is, 
countries for which less than 60 per cent of total government revenue comes from non-
resource taxes – only three have, on average, met even the very relaxed definition of 
democracy above (Venezuela, Botswana and Timor Leste). Of course, these are merely 
indicative cross-country correlations, and we turn now to the econometric analysis in order to 
gain a more robust picture of these relationships. 
 
 
3  Empirical strategy 
 
Seeking to move beyond simple correlations, we estimate several alternative econometric 
models that draw on the existing literature: a System-GMM panel estimator, a Mean Group 
estimator to exploit the time series dimension of our macro panel more fully, and, finally, 
random and fixed effects logit models designed to focus attention on the likelihood of 
																																																								
21  Angola, UAE, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Republic of the Congo, Algeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Timor-Leste and Yemen. 
22  Equivalent to a 0 value for the unadjusted Polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset, and much lower than the cut-off for 
defining democracy in most studies. 
23  Angola, UAE, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Botswana, Republic of the Congo, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Turkmenistan, Timor-Leste, Venezuela and Yemen. 
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transitions to (or from) democracy. Each estimator is subject to particular but distinct 
limitations. and we view the parallel implementation of all three as the best means to account 
for potential weaknesses in any individual estimation strategy. 
 
3.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE) and General 
Method of Moments (GMM) 
 
We begin with the following simple dynamic specification: 
 
Democracyi,t = Democracyi,t-l + β1Tax_reli,t-l + X’i,t- l γ + αi + λt + ei,t    [1] 
 
In the basic specification, Democracyi,t  is the measure of accountability for country i in period 
t. On the right-hand of equation [1], we include a lagged value of the dependent variable both 
to model the persistence of democracy over time, and to account for potential mean reverting 
dynamics. The key independent variable of interest is the lagged value of Tax_reli. In our 
main specifications we consider a single year lag, t-l where l=1, while we later also run 
robustness checks using l=3 and 5. The estimated parameter β1 captures the impact of tax 
reliance on the extent of accountability. The vector X’i,t includes our time-varying control 
variables. We add country fixed effects, αi, to control for omitted country-specific factors that 
do not change over time, and time dummies, λt,, to control for time-varying shocks that are 
common across countries. In all regressions, the error term, ei,t, captures all other omitted 
factors. 
 
After initially estimating the model using tax_rel as our independent variable, we 
disaggregate tax reliance into its component parts – tax revenue as a share of GDP (tottax) 
and non-tax revenue as a share of GDP (totnotax) – in order to attempt to disentangle 
competing causal arguments. Thus the second specification is: 
 
Democracyi,t = Democracyi,t-l + β1tottaxi,t-l + β2totnontaxi,t-l + X’i,t- l γ + αi + λt + ei,t  [2] 
 
where the parameters β1 and β2 now capture the effects of total tax revenue and total non-
tax revenue separately. 
 
An important concern in relation to the tax reliance (tax_rel) and total tax revenue (tottax) 
variables is the possibility of reverse causation: while increased taxation may drive increased 
democracy, increased democracy might also lead to increased taxation by encouraging 
greater quasi-voluntary tax compliance, or spurring expanded demands for government 
services (Levi 1988; Timmons 2010). This concern does not appear to apply to non-tax 
revenue, as there is no clear reason to expect democracy to shape non-tax revenue 
collection. Ross (2004: 238) argues that the use of a lagged dependent variable should 
address the problem of reverse causality, based on the assumption that, ‘a change in the 
independent variables (taxes and government services) should precede a change in the 
dependent variable (regime type)’.  
 
However, this is a highly imperfect solution, as it implies an a priori assumption about the 
direction and timing of causation. A more econometrically ideal approach would be to identify 
a source of exogenous variation in tax and non-tax revenue by adopting a quasi-
experimental design, or by employing an instrumental variables approach. However, over 
more than a decade of econometric research neither strategy has been implemented fully 
convincingly, with only highly imperfect instruments available.24 We therefore follow the bulk 
																																																								
24  In an interesting contribution, Ramsey (2011) employs natural disasters, which are expected to drive increased oil 
prices, as an instrument for increased oil revenue. However, this approach focuses attention primarily on the impact of 
short-term changes in oil prices rather than the long-term impacts of resource dependence, while, like most studies, his 
is an instrument for resource income rather than the level of revenue accruing to governments. Baskran and Bigsten 
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of the existing literature in concluding that panel data methods offer the best available 
strategy for estimating the relationship of interest.  
 
For the sake of completeness we first follow Ross (2004) by implementing a Pooled OLS 
model. However, the Pooled OLS model omits country fixed effects, and is likely to suffer 
from omitted variables bias (OVB). We subsequently run the FE model in order to control for 
time-invariant country heterogeneity. However, FE estimates that include a lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor, as in our case, are biased because of the correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable and the error term (Nickell 1981; Bond 2002). While 
neither result is thus robust, Bond (2002) explains that the initial naïve OLS regression is 
biased upwards, while the FE regression is biased downwards, implying that together they 
provide bounds on the actual values of the lagged dependent variable, thus offering a useful 
check on any subsequent results. 
 
In order to estimate a dynamic process with fixed effects we thus follow Aslaksen (2010) in 
employing GMM estimators that use instruments generated from the time series. The GMM 
models are considered the best estimator for dynamic processes with fixed effects where 
there are potentially endogenous regressors and idiosyncratic disturbances (country-specific 
patterns of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). Difference-GMM uses first differences as 
instruments, while system-GMM uses both first differences and lagged levels. Sys-GMM is 
preferable when – as in this case – there is a high degree of persistence of the variables of 
interest, as in these cases Diff-GMM suffers from weak instrumentation (Blundell and Bond 
1998). By using lagged levels of the variables as instruments, Sys-GMM preserves 
information on cross-country differences that is lost when only the first differenced equation 
is estimated, and is therefore more efficient (Aslaksen 2010).  
 
3.2 Mean Group-Common Correlated Effects (CCE-MG) estimator 
	
Reliance on Sys-GMM has become increasingly common across a wide range of topics in 
political science and economics, but is not without its limits. Most notably, its comparative 
advantage is with large-N but small-T datasets, whereas we have up to twenty-one years of 
data from 1990-2010. Haber and Menaldo (2011) correspondingly employ panel ECM 
regressions in order to make use of the time series dimension of their data, and we test their 
approach in the robustness tests to follow. However, in our view a more appropriate method 
for exploiting the time series dimension of the data is to use the CCE-MG estimator, which 
has been developed specifically to deal with such macro panels.25 Relative to conventional 
panel techniques it addresses both parameter heterogeneity and cross-section dependence, 
which we describe in turn (e.g. Holly et al. 2010; Cavalcanti et al. 2011; Fayad et al. 2011; 
Eberhardt and Teal 2013).  
 
Parameter heterogeneity concerns the slope coefficients in our estimated relationship. 
Pooled OLS, FE, GMM and panel ECM estimators all assume that these slope coefficients 
are constant across countries. It is at least plausible that they are not, and Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) show that in this case none of the methods mentioned produces a consistent 
estimate of the cross-country average slope. Notably, instrumental variables cannot help us: 
any potential instrument that is correlated with the regressor will necessarily also be 
correlated with the error term. The point therefore applies equally to the GMM estimates, 
which depend on lagged variables as instruments. 
																																																								
(2013) employ the manufacturing share of exports as an instrument for tax revenue, but existing empirical research 
suggests that a larger manufacturing sector is only a weak predictor of tax collection (e.g. Gupta 2007), while there are 
equal concerns that manufactured exports may be an independent cause of improved governance, as a large middle 
class has been widely argued to be a key determinant of democratisation (Moore 1966; Birdsall 2007). 
25  Haber and Menaldo (2011) also employ a dramatically longer time series, dating back to 1900, making their study more 
appropriate to time series methods.  
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Pesaran and Smith’s (1995) MG estimator overcomes this problem very simply by estimating 
the relationship between the levels of the dependent variable and the independent variable 
for each country individually, and then taking an average of the country-specific coefficients. 
However, this comes at a cost: the MG estimator does not model dynamics, and does not 
account for reverse causality. As such, if there is reverse causality then MG estimates will 
include the effects of both directions of causality, and cannot be interpreted simply as the 
impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Indeed, we find that our 
democracy variable does Granger-cause our revenue variables, suggesting that there is 
reverse causality.26 GMM-based estimates, while suffering from problematic instruments in 
the presence of heterogeneous coefficients, do not suffer from this problem. 
 
The second related issue addressed by the MG estimator is that both global factors that 
affect all countries, and spillover effects from one country to another, can lead to cross-
section correlation, confounding standard regression estimates (Pesaran 2006). While year 
dummies could account for the first type of effect, they could not account for the second. In 
our case, spillover effects are highly plausible: democratic transition in one country seems 
likely to increase pressure on its neighbours to follow suit, as evinced by the recent ‘Arab 
Spring’ and arguably the wave of democratisation in Latin America in the 1980s. Pesaran 
(2006) develops CCE estimators to account for this cross-section correlation. These 
estimators augment the regression with year-specific cross-section (in our case, cross-
country) averages of the variables as proxies for unobserved global and local factors, 
allowing the coefficients on these averages to vary across countries. This technique can be 
combined with the MG estimator above, giving us the CCE-MG estimator. 
 
3.3 Logistic regressions focusing on regime transitions 
 
The GMM and CCE-MG estimators offer robust and complementary approaches to 
estimating the relationship between the composition of government revenue and continuous 
measures of the level of democracy. However, several studies have argued for a more 
narrow focus on the impact of the composition of government revenue on the likelihood of 
transition from autocracy to democracy or, alternatively, from democracy to autocracy. 
 
At the level of theory, Smith (2004), Morrison (2009) and others have proposed that resource 
wealth may not be inherently pro- or anti-democratic, but may simply make any existing form 
of government more resistant to change. That is, regime transitions from either autocracy or 
democracy may become less likely with greater access to resource wealth, as resource 
wealth allows regimes to secure political support and confront political resistance. In this 
case, we would not expect to find a positive or negative relationship between resource 
dependence and democracy, but, rather, an impact of resource dependence on the likelihood 
of political transition.  
 
A focus on regime transitions equally addresses a pragmatic estimation problem: many 
resource-rich countries were already very undemocratic prior to acquiring large-scale 
resource revenue (or prior to the expansion of existing resource revenue). As a result, it is 
often impossible for increased resource revenue to lead to a significant further decrease in 
the level of democracy. Instead, in these cases we expect increased resource wealth to 
result in greater persistence of autocracy, reflected in a reduced likelihood of a transition 
towards greater democracy.  
 
																																																								
26  We test Granger causality by regressing variable y on its own first and second lag, and on the lag of variable x, where x 
Granger-causes y if the coefficient on the lag of x is significant. We find that polity Granger-causes totnotax with 
p=6.7%, polity Granger-causes tottax with p=1.5%, totnotax Granger-causes polity with p=0.0%, and tottax Granger-
causes polity with p=1.3%. In all cases the sign is as expected: polity is negatively correlated with totnotax and 
positively correlated with tottax. Further details available from the authors. 
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We thus conclude the empirical analysis by following Wiens et al. (forthcoming) in estimating 
a dynamic logit model that captures the impact of the composition of government revenue on 
the likelihood that a country will transition between democracy and autocracy. Following  
Wiens et al. (forthcoming), our prediction is that higher non-tax revenue and reduced tax 
reliance will reduce the likelihood of transition to democracy, but will have little, if any, impact 
on the likelihood of transition from democracy to autocracy. The latter reflects arguments that 
the political resource curse is likely to be less important where democracy is already 
established, and political institutions are comparatively resilient (Mehlum et al. 2006).  
 
In order to test these predictions the model differs somewhat from the discussion so far. 
When we test the impact of tax_rel it is: 
 
PrሺRegime௜,௧ሻ ൌΛ ቂߜRegime௜,௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଵTax_rel௜,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚଶRegime ൈ Tax_rel௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܺ′௜,௧ିଵ
൅ ߚସRegime௜,௧ିଵ ൈ ܺ′௜,௧ିଵ	൅	λ௧ ൅ 	Ղ௜,௧ቃ 																																																											 ሾ3ሿ	
 
While separating tax_rel into its component parts, tottax and totnontax, gives us: 
 
PrሺRegime௜,௧ሻ ൌΛ ቂߜRegime௜,௧ିଵ ൅ 	ߚଵTax_rel௜,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚଶRegime ൈ Tax_rel௜,௧ିଵ
൅ 	ߚଷTax_rel௜,௧ିଵ ൅	ߚସRegime ൈ Tax_rel௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܺ′௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺Regime௜,௧ିଵ
ൈ ܺ′௜,௧ିଵ	൅	λ௧ ൅ 	Ղ௜,௧ቃ 																																																											 ሾ4ሿ 
 
In both equations the new measure of democracy is the binary variable Regime, which is 
coded 1 if the country is a democracy, and 0 if the country is an autocracy. The variable is 
based on the variable presented in Przeworski et al. (2000) and extended through 2008 by 
Cheibub et al. (2010). Our dependent variables, tax reliance (tax_rel), total tax revenue 
(tottax) and total non-tax revenue (totnnotax), are unchanged from earlier models. X’ is our 
group of control variables. Our primary results employ the same controls employed by Wiens 
et al. (forthcoming) for the sake of comparability: lgdp, civil_war and growthpc. However, we 
also present results using the same battery of control variables employed in the Sys-GMM 
and CCE-MG estimations, and the results are essentially unchanged. λt  are time dummies 
for every year in the sample, and ei,t are the error terms.  
 
The key innovation in Wiens et al. (forthcoming), and replicated here, is the inclusion of 
interaction terms between lagged Regime and each of the variables on the right-hand side of 
the equation. The interaction terms condition the effect of each of the independent variables 
on the presence or absence of democracy, and allow us to identify whether the revenue 
variables have distinct impacts in democracies and autocracies. The total effect of the 
revenue variables in democracies is thus the sum of the coefficients on the revenue term, 
and on the interaction terms between the revenue terms and regime. 
 
As with earlier models, we wish to account for the effects of unobserved country 
heterogeneity. However, the inclusion of fixed effects when employing a binary measure of 
democracy results in dropping from the analysis any country that did not experience a 
political transition between 1990 and 2010. This leaves only twenty-nine countries, while 
excluding almost all major resource producers.27 Wiens et al. (forthcoming) address this 
problem by employing a random effects specification in order to account for unobserved 
country heterogeneity as far as possible while retaining necessary country coverage. This is 
an imperfect solution to the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, but is a potentially 
																																																								
27  This figure includes 16 transitions to autocracy, and 46 transitions to democracy. When the data is extended back to 
include the period 1980-2010 in our robustness checks, the analysis includes 24 transitions to autocracy and 63 
transitions to democracy, across 41 countries. 
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sensible econometric compromise in the interest of testing a more theoretically attractive 
model. 
 
In order to test the validity of adopting a random effects specification, we run a Hausman test 
of the null hypothesis that there are no systematic differences between the coefficients in the 
fixed effects and the random effects models (Hausman 1978). The test returns a negative 
value, which the literature generally interprets as a valid basis for employing random effects 
(Hausman and McFadden 1984). However, the robustness of simply accepting a negative 
Hausman statistic has been questioned (Vijverberg 2011), and, in order to err on the side of 
caution, we report the first set of core results employing both the random effects and fixed 
effects estimations, as the key messages are broadly consistent across both models.28 
 
 
4  Results 
 
We first present results employing our array of panel data techniques, before turning to the 
results of the dynamic logit regressions. Table 1a presents estimates for Pooled OLS, Fixed 
Effects, Diff- and Sys-GMM and CCE-MG models, with tax reliance (tax_rel) as the 
independent variable. Table 1b presents estimates when we instead include total tax 
revenue (tottax) and total non-tax revenue (totnontax) as distinct regressors. In both cases 
we initially adopt a parsimonious specification of our model, controlling only for the log of 
GPD per capita (lgdp). 29 
 
Table 1a Effect of tax reliance on polity, across different estimation methods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled OLS FE Diff-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
CCE-MG w/o 
trend 
CCE-MG 
with trend 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.Polity_s 0.9410*** 0.7231*** 0.8040*** 0.8741***   
 (0.0113) (0.0289) (0.0422) (0.0359)   
L.Tax_Rel 4.4130*** 0.3130 2.9361 18.0684***   
 (1.1760) (2.9529) (8.2961) (5.3422)   
Tax_Rel     14.3193** 16.2505** 
     (7.2816) (7.1634) 
L.lgdp 0.2371 -0.5221 5.7623* -0.8896   
 (0.1607) (1.1645) (2.9603) (1.2806)   
lgdp     9.6114* 11.1951 
     (5.1366) (10.2255) 
trend      0.3168 
      (0.6178) 
AR(1)   0.000 0.000   
AR(2)   0.623 0.648   
Hansen   0.222 0.376   
No. of obs. 2579 2579 2424 2579 2682 2674 
No. of countries  155.000 155.000 155.000 154.000 152.000 
r2 0.937 0.602     
Notes: All regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure.  Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are 
valid.  The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation.  Residuals of the CCE-MG 
regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-
stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and 
without trend). See text for discussion. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
																																																								
28  While not reported here, all the subsequent robustness checks are also implemented using fixed effects, and the pattern 
of results is consistent. Results available on request. 
29  Our core results treat lgdp as endogenous given the possibility that democracy may affect economic growth, though the 
results remain positive and significant when lgdp is treated as exogenous. 
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Table 1b Effect of total tax and non-tax revenue on polity, across different estimation 
methods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled OLS FE Diff-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
CCE-MG w/o 
trend 
CCE-MG 
with trend 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.Polity_s 0.9422*** 0.7244*** 0.7985*** 0.8612***   
 (0.0112) (0.0285) (0.0369) (0.0280)   
L.TotTax 3.8814 -17.4542** -18.3505 -11.7086   
 (2.7511) (6.8917) (16.2196) (15.5717)   
L.totnontax -9.0711*** -6.8190 -4.3349 -26.0380***   
 (2.4282) (4.4497) (9.6489) (8.3181)   
TotTax     73.7190** 54.0306* 
     (30.8115) (29.3426) 
totnotax     -137.2164** -156.036*** 
     (57.2204) (58.4479) 
L.lgdp 0.1472 -0.4235 2.8651 -1.6612   
 (0.1579) (1.1072) (2.7534) (1.3640)   
lgdp     10.7081* 14.3815 
     (6.4542) (11.0953) 
trend      -0.0880 
      (0.5124) 
AR(1)   0.000 0.000   
AR(2)   0.647 0.650   
Hansen   0.140 0.291   
No. of obs. 2579 2579 2424 2579 2674 2669 
No. of countries  155.000 155.000 155.000 152.000 151.000 
r2 0.937 0.603     
Notes: All regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure.  Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are 
valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. Residuals of the CCE-MG 
regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In both cases the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-
stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and 
without trend). See text for discussion. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
As can be seen in Table 1a, pooled OLS produces a strongly significant positive coefficient 
on (lagged) tax reliance, but the coefficient is insignificant when we take country-specific 
fixed effects into account with the FE model. Turning to the GMM estimates, the results 
remain insignificant when employing the Diff-GMM estimator, but are again positive and 
significant at the 5 per cent level when we use Sys-GMM.  
 
The estimates employ two-step Windmeijer corrected standard errors, which correct for 
downward bias in the standard errors in a finite sample (given that the GMM framework is 
based on asymptotically large samples), thus providing larger and more reliable confidence 
intervals. Following Roodman (2006, 2009) the Sys-GMM results also include tests for 
second-order autocorrelation, as well as results of the Hansen test of instrument validity, and 
in both cases we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the results are valid.30 The overall 
pattern of results is entirely consistent with results reported by Aslaksen (2010) in her tests of 
the relationship between resource wealth and democracy. As in her case, we attribute the 
stronger results when employing Sys-GMM to the fact that the Sys-GMM estimator makes 
use of a wider variety of information, and is thus more efficient when the key variables 
change slowly.  
																																																								
30  Roodman (2009) urges caution in interpreting Hansen test statistics, for which implausibly high values approaching 1 
can indicate the failure of the test owing to the excessive proliferation of instruments. For this reason he urges reliance 
wherever possible on more parsimonious specifications, which is the strategy that we adopt here. 
	 22
The CCE-MG estimates also produce positive coefficients on tax reliance, significant at the 5 
per cent level both with and without trend, as the trend itself is highly insignificant. For these 
regressions we tested the residuals for stationarity. The Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit 
root test rejects non-stationarity at the 1 per cent level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit 
root test (CIPS) fails to reject non-stationarity. The primary difference between the two is that 
Maddala and Wu (1999) assumes cross-section independence, while CIPS does not. Since 
the residuals are the result of regressions that already control for cross-section correlation 
(the CCE part of the CCE-MG estimator), they are indeed cross-sectionally independent, so 
the Maddala and Wu (1999) test is valid and we can accept its rejection of non-stationarity. 
 
Table 1b disaggregates tax reliance into tax revenue (tottax) and non-tax revenue 
(totnontax), and the results suggest that the positive and significant coefficients on tax 
reliance are driven primarily by the effect of non-tax revenue, though the results are not 
uniform. In the Sys-GMM regression the coefficient on totnontax is negative and significant at 
the 1 per cent level, while the coefficient on tottax is insignificant and has an unexpectedly 
negative sign. By partial contrast, in the CCE-MG regressions both tottax and totnontax are 
significant and with the expected sign. As with the tax reliance variable, the Maddala and Wu 
(1999) test confirms that the residuals are stationary. The greater significance of the tottax 
variable in the CCE-MG estimations may be explained by the fact that the CCE-MG 
estimator captures the long-run relationship in levels between tax collection and democracy. 
Because it does not account for reverse causation, the result may include a positive impact 
of democracy on tax collection – consistent with our finding of Granger causation in both 
directions. Meanwhile, the CCE-MG model also relaxes assumptions about the dynamic 
structure of the data – a point to which we return in the discussion. 
 
Having established this baseline, Tables 2a and 2b progressively introduce additional control 
variables for the Sys-GMM and CCE-MG models in turn. Table 2a reports results for the Sys-
GMM estimations, and we find that the results are essentially unchanged with the inclusion of 
the new control variables, with the exception of tottax becoming marginally significant and 
again negative in Column 10. Table 2b reports results for the CCE-MG estimations, though 
we do not included the control for regional democratic diffusion given that CCE-MG already 
controls for cross-section correlation.31 Again the bulk of the results prove robust to 
alternative control variables. The coefficients on both tax_rel and totnontax become larger 
and more significant with additional controls. However, the positive coefficient on the total tax 
variable in our baseline specification – which includes only log GDP as a control – is not 
robust to the addition of the control variables. The overall value of adding the control 
variables is open to question as they are almost universally insignificant, but the sensitivity of 
the total tax variable is notable. 
																																																								
31  The pattern of significance is unchanged when regional democratic diffusion is included, but the point estimates become 
somewhat more imprecise (though also somewhat larger). 
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Table 2a Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on polity, controlling for a full set of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Sys-GMM two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.Polity_s 0.8905*** 0.8741*** 0.8726*** 0.8658*** 0.8671*** 0.8652*** 0.8612*** 0.8642*** 0.8523*** 0.8624*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0371) (0.0365) (0.0353) (0.0309) (0.0280) (0.0271) (0.0288) (0.0278) 
L.Tax_Rel 11.4557** 18.0684*** 17.3664*** 14.9164** 15.8768***      
 (5.8238) (5.3422) (5.5898) (5.9211) (5.2605)      
L.TotTax      -10.5979 -11.7086 -10.7905 -16.8992 -25.5627* 
      (13.5838) (15.5717) (14.8840) (15.4091) (15.2234) 
L.totnotax      -17.2002* -26.0380*** -27.0054*** -28.5379*** -29.7871*** 
      (9.1191) (8.3181) (8.2345) (9.0730) (10.1836) 
L.lgdp  -0.8896 -0.6360 -1.0146 -1.7376  -1.6612 -1.2962 -0.8832 -2.5850 
  (1.2806) (1.2099) (1.0250) (1.5148)  (1.3640) (1.3039) (1.3268) (1.6874) 
L.Pop   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
L.Civil_War    -1.0229 -1.3181    -1.7178 -1.7057 
    (1.3300) (1.4771)    (1.2118) (1.3935) 
L.Region_Dem
Diffuse 
    0.0755     0.1562*** 
     (0.0501)     (0.0503) 
Implied long-
term effect  
104.6182 
 
143.5139 
 
136.3140 
 
111.1505 
 
119.4643 
 
-127.597 
 
-187.593 
 
-198.862 
 
-193.215 
 
-216.476 
 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.644 0.648 0.650 0.664 0.693 0.651 0.650 0.648 0.682 0.731 
Hansen 0.560 0.376 0.351 0.344 0.521 0.207 0.291 0.295 0.192 0.259 
N 2648 2579 2576 2544 2536 2648 2579 2576 2544 2536 
N_g 157.000 155.000 155.000 153.000 152.000 157.000 155.000 155.000 153.000 152.000 
Notes: All regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-values reported for the Hansen 
statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. Implied long-term effect calculated using the 
formula /(1 - ), where  is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, and  is the coefficient on the revenue variable of interest. Long term effects in Columns (1) – (5) is for tax_rel, while for 
columns (6) – (10) it is for totnontax. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
  
	 24 
Table 2b Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on polity, controlling for a full set of covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 CCE-MG  w/o trend 
CCE-MG  
w/o trend 
CCE-MG  
w/o trend 
CCE-MG  
w/o trend 
CCE-MG  
w/o trend 
CCE-MG  
w/o trend 
CCE-MG  
w/o trend 
CCE-MG  
w/o trend 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Tax_Rel 14.6396* 14.3193** 18.3955*** 20.6028***     
 (8.6574) (7.2816) (6.8242) (7.6264)     
TotTax     19.4631 73.7190** 41.4703 51.7679 
     (28.3911) (30.8115) (29.0371) (35.1532) 
totnotax     -136.4237** -137.2164** -158.5317*** -155.2035** 
     (63.9151) (57.2204) (61.3340) (66.4175) 
lgdp  9.6114* 5.6048 5.5947  10.7081* 9.1711 4.7162 
  (5.1366) (8.5748) (8.3597)  (6.4542) (10.8602) (10.6713) 
Pop   0.0000 0.0000   -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000)   (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Civil_War    -0.1046    -0.5235 
    (0.4150)    (0.3874) 
N 2754 2682 2671 2634 2751 2674 2666 2604 
N_g 156.000 154.000 152.000 149.000 155.000 152.000 151.000 144.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Residuals of the CCE-MG regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all cases, the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-stationarity at 
the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and without trend). See text for discussion. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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The magnitude of the effects of tax reliance and non-tax revenue on democracy is 
substantial. Looking first at the Sys-GMM estimates, we draw on the results that include the 
full set of controls (columns 5 and 10 of Table 2a). The coefficient of 15.89 on tax_rel implies 
that a 10 percentage point increase in tax_rel will produce a short-term increase in 
democracy of 1.59 percentage points. To place these magnitudes in perspective, a move 
from the level of tax reliance of Senegal (average tax_rel = 0.91) to that of Nigeria (average 
tax_rel = 0.22) produces a relatively modest 11 percentage point decline in the level of 
democracy.  
 
However, we can also calculate the implied long-term effect, reported near the bottom of 
Table 2a, and it is substantially larger: over the long term, the same 70 percentage point 
decline in tax reliance is expected to reduce the level of democracy by 80 percentage points 
– the equivalent of going from the United States to Kazakhstan or Morocco.32 The individual 
impact of changes in non-tax revenue on democracy is substantively similar: a change from 
the level of non-tax revenue in Senegal (average non-tax revenue = 1.5 per cent of GDP) to 
that of Nigeria (average non-tax revenue = 22 per cent of GDP) is expected to generate a 
short-term decline in democracy of 6 percentage points, and a long-term decline of 43 
percentage points. An increase in non-tax revenue to a level of 43 per cent of GDP – the 
level in Angola in 2008 – would imply a long-term decline in democracy of almost 90 
percentage points.  
 
The CCE-MG results provide estimates exclusively of the long-term relationship, and we 
focus on the results in Columns 4 and 9. The magnitude of the relationship between tax_rel 
and democracy is comparable to the short-run estimates for the Sys-GMM results, and 
substantially smaller than long-run estimates from those regressions. The coefficient of 20.6 
on tax reliance implies that a rise of 10 percentage points in tax reliance is associated with a 
rise of 2.06 percentage points in the polity score. Taking the same example as previously, a 
shift from the level of tax reliance in Senegal to that in Nigeria would imply a 14.2 per cent 
decline in democracy – the equivalent in 2010 of moving from Malawi (polity = 80) to Niger 
(polity = 65). However, the coefficient on non-tax revenue is substantially larger, and more in 
line with the Sys-GMM results: it implies that a 10 percentage point increase in non-tax 
revenue as a share of GDP is associated with a 15.5 percentage point decrease in 
democracy. Again using the earlier example, an increase from the level of non-tax revenue in 
Senegal to that of Nigeria would be associated with a 31 percentage point decline in 
democracy, while non-tax revenue at the level of Angola would imply a decline in democracy 
of greater than 60 percentage points. 
 
Having reviewed the Sys-GMM and CCE-MG results, Tables 3a and 3b present the results 
employing the dynamic logit model, reporting, in turn, results using random effects and fixed 
effects. The results estimate the effect of the composition of government revenue on the 
likelihood of transition between autocracy and democracy. Columns 1 and 2 in each table 
report results without controls, columns 3 and 4 report results employing the same controls 
employed in the Sys-GMM and CCE-MG estimates, and columns 5 and 6 report results 
including the same controls as Wiens et al. (forthcoming): lgdp, civil_war and growthpc. 
 
  
																																																								
32  Following Aslaksen (2010) the long-term effect is calculated as /(1 - ), where  is the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable, and  is the coefficient on the revenue variable of interest. 
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Table 3a Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on regime using random 
effects logit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Logit - RE Logit - RE Logit - RE Logit - RE Logit - RE Logit - RE 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.regime 8.7893*** 4.0642*** -3.8956 1.2185 -5.2888 -0.6607 
 (1.4890) (0.9087) (4.0110) (3.3445) (3.5544) (2.8037) 
L.Tax_Rel 2.0738**  0.9573  1.5100  
 (0.8913)  (1.1176)  (1.0490)  
L.regimextaxrel -0.1405  2.4272  1.9235  
 (1.8853)  (1.8739)  (1.8691)  
L.TotTax  -5.5241*  -6.2322  -6.2755* 
  (3.1807)  (3.8912)  (3.7480) 
L.TotNonTax  -9.8712***  -10.5769*  -12.5968** 
  (3.6259)  (5.4163)  (5.3654) 
L.regimextottax  27.4911***  17.9933**  16.7894** 
  (6.5148)  (8.8547)  (8.1804) 
L.regimextotnontax  13.6779**  7.2707  8.6665 
  (6.8268)  (7.4311)  (7.4713) 
L.lgdp   -0.4881* -0.1096 -0.2379 0.1238 
   (0.2557) (0.2902) (0.2263) (0.2608) 
L.Pop   -0.0000 -0.0000   
   (0.0000) (0.0000)   
L.Civil_War   -0.9964 -1.1218 -1.0092 -1.1202 
   (0.7721) (0.7755) (0.7729) (0.7740) 
L.Region_Dem_Diffuse   0.0243** 0.0200*   
   (0.0117) (0.0114)   
L.Growthpc     -0.0333 -0.0336 
     (0.0303) (0.0295) 
L.regimexlgdp   1.2304** 0.4326 1.5121*** 0.7510* 
   (0.4999) (0.5652) (0.3810) (0.4431) 
L.regimexpop   0.0000 0.0000   
   (0.0000) (0.0000)   
L.regimexcivilwar   -0.2575 -0.1232 0.2652 0.3397 
   (1.1924) (1.1928) (1.1874) (1.1855) 
L.regimexdemdiffuse   0.0044 0.0086   
   (0.0220) (0.0216)   
L.regimexgrowthpc     0.0917 0.0911 
     (0.0681) (0.0685) 
Aggregate effects in 
democracies 
      
1 + 2 1.9333  3.3844**  3.4334**  
 (1.6552)  (1.5016)  (1.5399)  
1 + 3  21.9669***  11.7610  10.51384 
  (5.7284)  (7.9517)  (7.2802) 
2 + 4  3.8067  -3.3062  -3.9303 
  (5.7743)  (5.1022)  (5.1777) 
Random effects model 
descriptors 
      
  .0001892 .0001973 .0021279 .0020675 .0020783 .001475 
  1.09e-08 1.18e-08 1.38e-06 1.30e-06 1.31e-06 6.61e-07 
N 2807 2807 2322 2322 2305 2305 
N_g 183.000 183.000 155.000 155.000 157.000 157.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 1 +2 captures the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel variables, and 
thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1). 1 +3 similarly captures the joint 
significance of tottax and regime x tottax, while 2 + 4 captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table 3b Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on regime using fixed 
effects logit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Logit - FE Logit - FE Logit - FE Logit - FE Logit - FE Logit - FE 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.regime 5.0349*** 4.9087 9.8169 11.3485* 4.3906 4.9988 
 (1.7079) (1.1528) (7.4420) (5.9689) (5.0130) (3.8021) 
L.Tax_Rel 6.4060**  7.8037**  7.6642**  
 (3.0239)  (3.3873)  (3.3890)  
L.regimextaxrel -.67088  -0.5483  -0.2264  
 (2.1514)  (2.8489)  (2.3673)  
L.TotTax  25.2865*  26.3396  21.6904 
  (14.7148)  (16.2750)  (15.8069) 
L.TotNonTax  -10.7415  -19.5740  -15.0584 
  (8.2790)  (12.2259)  (10.0924) 
L.regimextottax  -4.1663  -2.0454  -4.5262 
  (8.6561)  (10.3500)  (9.6103) 
L.regimextotnontax  1.5316  1.1267  2.0054 
  (7.0117)  (11.9882)  (8.0799) 
L.lgdp   -0.0966 -0.6407 0.9682 0.9285 
   (2.1380) (2.3219) (1.8678) (1.9143) 
L.Pop   0.0000 0.0000   
   (0.0000) (0.0000)   
L.Civil_War   -0.7234 -0.8511 -0.8119 -0.7654 
   (1.1417) (1.1757) (1.0971) (1.1020) 
L.Region_Dem_Diffuse   0.0855* 0.0682   
   (0.0519) (0.0522)   
L.Growthpc     0.0173 0.0061 
     (0.0389) (0.0420) 
L.regimexlgdp   -0.9150 -1.2311 0.0445 -0.0090 
   (0.9292) (0.9771) (0.5593) (0.5763) 
L.regimexpop   0.0000* 0.0000*   
   (0.0000) (0.0000)   
L.regimexcivilwar   -1.3783 -1.2913 -0.4830 -0.4226 
   (1.4852) (1.5142) (1.3719) (1.3703) 
L.regimexdemdiffuse   0.0358 0.0504   
   (0.0291) (0.0308)   
L.regimexgrowthpc     0.0759 0.0797 
     (0.0848) (0.0853) 
Aggregate effects in 
democracies 
      
1 + 2 5.7352*  7.2553*  7.4378*  
 (3.4097)  (4.1093)  (3.8090)  
1 + 3  21.1202  24.2942  17.1641 
  (15.6522)  (17.3369)  (16.4619) 
2 + 4  -9.2098  -18.4473  -13.0529 
  (8.8622)  (13.9366)  (8.7285) 
N 479 479 458 458 458 458 
N_g 29.000 29.000 28.000 28.000 28.000 28.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 1 +2 captures the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel variables, and 
thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1). 1 +3 similarly captures the joint 
significance of tottax and regime x tottax, while 2 + 4 captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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The overall results are again generally consistent with expectations, though they are 
somewhat ‘noisy’ and suggest additional nuance. Focusing on the random effects estimates, 
the most consistent finding is a negative and significant relationship between totnontax and 
regime. Because of the interaction terms in the model, the coefficient on totnontax (and those 
on the other revenue variables) tells us that an increase in non-tax revenue reduces the 
likelihood that a non-democratic state will transition to democracy. The tax reliance variable, 
tax_rel, likewise follows expectations, as it is positive and significant when no controls are 
included in the model, though it loses significance at conventional levels as controls are 
added. The comparative weakness of the tax_rel variable is, in turn, attributable to the total 
tax revenue variable, tottax, which is unexpectedly negative, and significant at the 10 per 
cent level in some specifications. As with previous results, the overarching message is that 
totnontax has a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of transition to democracy, 
while the impact of tax revenue is very mixed. 
 
However, the subsequent results complicate this simple story. First, the fixed effects results – 
which act as an important robustness check given the ambiguous Hausman test results 
noted earlier – follow a somewhat different pattern from the random effects estimates. The 
coefficient on totnontax remains negative, with a magnitude comparable to the random 
effects results, but falls slightly short of statistical significance. This can in part be explained 
by the dramatically reduced sample size. Meanwhile, tottax is now both positive in all 
specifications, and significant when no controls are included. This, in turn, results in the 
coefficient on tax_rel being positive and significant across all the fixed effects results. Both 
the fixed and random effects results thus indicate the existence of a political resource curse, 
but they tell a mixed story about the respective roles of tax and non-tax revenue in driving 
this relationship. 
 
Adding further complexity are the interaction terms, which allow us to discern the distinct 
effect of the revenue variables in democracies. The interaction term itself tells us whether the 
relationship is statistically different in democracies than in autocracies, while the overall 
effect in democracies is calculated as the sum of the coefficient on the interaction term and 
the coefficient on the revenue term (reported below the core results).33 As noted earlier, 
Wiens et al. (forthcoming) find no effect of natural resource wealth in democracies, while 
Morrison (2009) argues that greater non-tax revenue in fact strengthens existing 
democracies.  
 
Our results mirror those of Wiens et al. (forthcoming) – and contradict those of Morrison 
(2009) – as we find that totnontax does not have a significant effect in democracies, though 
the coefficient remains negative (row 2 + 4 in Table 3a). Like Wiens et al. (forthcoming), 
we attribute this to the fact that democratic institutions are able to mitigate the negative 
political costs of resource wealth. However, we also find that the effect of tax_rel is positive 
and significant in democracies, in both the random effects and fixed effects models (row 1 + 
3 in Table 3a). The implication of the random effects results is that while the negative 
impact of non-tax revenue is comparatively muted in existing democracies, the political 
benefits of tax collection are enhanced (with the regime x tottax interaction term positive and 
significant).34 
 
To summarise, two conclusions appear relatively robust. First, we have relatively consistent 
evidence that increases in non-tax revenue result in a reduced likelihood of democratic 
transition. Second, we find a generally positive association between tax reliance and 
democracy in both autocracies and democracies, though the fixed effects and random effects 
																																																								
33  For example, the impact of tax_rel in democracies is equal to the joint significance of tax_rel and regime x taxrel. 
34  The fixed effects results are consistent with this story, but suggest that autocracies and democracies are quite similar, 
with taxation moderately encouraging democracy and non-tax revenue moderately discouraging tax revenue in both 
cases. 
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estimates vary in the extent to which they attribute this finding to the democratising effects of 
taxation or the anti-democratic effects of non-tax revenue, highlighting the need for caution in 
drawing strong conclusions.  
 
Because the logit estimates are non-linear, we separately calculate the magnitude of the 
effects, reported in Tables 3c and 3d, drawing on the results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3a. 
The top half of Table 3c reports the likelihood that a country that is an autocracy in period t-1 
will become a democracy at time t, with different levels of non-tax revenue, no civil war and 
all other variables set to the mean level for developing countries.35 The bottom half of the 
table, in turn, reports the likelihood of becoming a democracy at time t at different levels of 
tax reliance.36 Table 3d reverses the question of interest, and reports the likelihood that a 
democratic country will remain a democracy at time t, for different levels of non-tax revenue 
and tax reliance.37 
 
Table 3c Likelihood of transition to democracy  
 Level of non-tax revenue as % of GDP 
 2% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
Pr(Democracy) at t 0.0422 0.0292 0.0157 0.0044 0.0012 
95% confidence interval 
(upper) 
0.0652 0.0425 0.0266 0.0128 0.0046 
95% confidence interval 
(lower) 
0.0192 0.0159 0.0047 -0.0029 -0.0021 
 Level of tax reliance (tax revenue share of total government revenue) 
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.75 0.9 
Pr(Democracy) at t 0.0114 0.0155 0.0211 0.0265 0.0333 
95% confidence interval 
(upper) 
0.0247 0.0280 0.0321 0.0387 0.0524 
95% confidence interval 
(lower) 
-0.0019 0.0031 0.0101 0.0143 0.0142 
Notes: Likelihood of transition to democracy at different values of non-tax revenue and tax reliance. Calculated based on 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3a, using margins command in Stata, with regime = 0, civil_war = 0 and other variables set to their 
mean values excluding OECD countries. The mean level of lgdp is 7.89 (equivalent to per capita income of $2670), the mean 
level of growthpc is 2.51 and the mean level of tottax is 0.136 (13.6% of GDP). 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
  
																																																								
35  To calculate this likelihood we employ the margins command in Stata and set regime = 0, civilwar = 0 and the other 
variables at their mean values excluding OECD countries, given that most of the variation in totnontax and tax_rel 
occurs within this group. The mean level of lgdp is 7.89 (equivalent to per capita income of $2670), the mean level of 
growthpc is 2.51, and the mean level of total tax revenue as a share of GDP is 13.6%. 
36  Though recognising that the coefficient on the tax reliance variable varies significantly across models. 
37  Bearing in mind that the non-tax revenue variable is insignificant in democracies. 
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Table 3d Likelihood of transition to autocracy  
 Level of non-tax revenue as % of GDP 
 2% 5% 10% 20% 30% 
Pr(Democracy) at t 0.9897 0.9884 0.9861 0.9795 0.9702 
95% confidence interval 
(upper) 
0.9981 0.9970 0.9982 1.0128 1.0456 
95% confidence interval 
(lower) 
0.9814 0.9780 0.9739 0.9463 0.8949 
 Level of tax reliance (tax revenue share of total government revenue) 
 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.75 0.9 
Pr(Democracy) at t 0.9265 0.9622 0.9809 0.9886 0.9932 
95% confidence interval 
(upper) 
1.0393 1.0040 0.9956 0.9970 0.9996 
95% confidence interval 
(lower) 
0.8136 0.9204 0.9663 0.9803 0.9869 
Notes: Likelihood of transition to democracy at different values of non-tax revenue and tax reliance. Calculated based on 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3a, using margins command in Stata, with regime = 0, civil_war = 0 and other variables set to their 
mean values excluding OECD countries. The mean level of lgdp is 7.89 (equivalent to per capita income of $2670), the mean 
level of growthpc is 2.51 and the mean level of tottax is 0.136 (13.6% of GDP). 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
As with the earlier results, the magnitude of the effects is substantial. With all other variables 
at their means for developing countries, an autocratic country with non-tax revenue of 2 per 
cent of GDP (e.g. Mozambique or Gambia in 200838) has a 4.2 per cent probability of 
transitioning to democracy in a given year. By contrast, an autocratic country with non-tax 
revenue of 10 per cent of GDP (e.g. Malaysia) has only a 1.6 per cent probability of a 
democratic transition, while non-tax revenue of 20 per cent of GDP (e.g. Gabon or Chad) 
drops that probability to 0.44 per cent, though at this level the values become more 
imprecise. Put differently, the likelihood of a democratic transition declines by almost a third 
as non-tax revenue increases to 10 per cent of GDP, and by almost 90 per cent when non-
tax revenue increases to 20 per cent. The effect of changes in tax reliance is somewhat 
smaller (based on the random effects results): a country where tax revenue makes up 90 per 
cent of total government revenue (e.g. Burkina Faso) has a 3.3 per cent probability of 
transitioning to democracy in any given year, while that number drops to 1.1 per cent in 
countries where only 20 per cent of government revenue arrives through taxation (e.g. 
Equatorial Guinea or Azerbaijan).  
 
These patterns are somewhat different for democracies, where changes in tax reliance have 
a larger impact than changes in non-tax revenue alone. This suggests that democratic 
countries are particularly likely to become autocracies when they combine high non-tax 
revenue with very weak tax collection. Thus, a democratic country with tax reliance of 0.9 
(e.g. the Philippines), and other variables at their developing country means, has a less than 
1 per cent likelihood of transitioning to autocracy in any given year, while an otherwise 
identical country with tax reliance of 0.2 (e.g. Nigeria) has an almost 7 per cent likelihood of 
becoming an autocracy. By contrast, a focus only on the role of non-tax revenue alone yields 
substantially smaller effects: a democratic country with non-tax revenue of 20 per cent of 
GDP (e.g. Nigeria), but an average level of tax collection, has a 2.2 per cent probability of 
transitioning to autocracy, while this value declines only modestly to 1.1 per cent in a country 
with non-tax revenue of only 2 per cent (e.g. Senegal).  
 
The bottom line is that increased non-tax revenue and decreased tax reliance have very 
large impacts on the likelihood that a country will transition to, or remain, a democracy. This 
																																																								
38  Note that these country examples are strictly to illustrate countries at these magnitudes of the revenue variables. The 
likelihood of any individual country experiencing a regime transition will be somewhat different from the averages 
reported here, owing to values on the control variables that differ from developing country averages as well as 
unobserved country-specific factors.  
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has important real world implications, as it implies that the recent discoveries of oil in a range 
of low-income countries carry with them substantial future governance risks that demand 
focused policy attention. 
 
 
5  Robustness checks 
	
Having presented the core results, we test their robustness to changes in the length of the 
lag on the independent variables, the use of alternative dependent variables, the use of a 
longer (but less complete) time series, the exclusion of different groups of countries and 
reliance on central government data only. We also subject our new data to the methods 
recommended by Haber and Menaldo (2011). In all cases the results prove robust to these 
alternatives, though useful additional insights emerge. 
	
5.1 Alternative lag lengths 
 
Ross (2004) and Andersen and Ross (2014) have argued that any causal impact of changes 
in the composition of government revenue will likely take longer than a single year to take 
effect, and have correspondingly argued for employing longer lags on the explanatory 
variables in order to more accurately model the causal relationship. Consistent with this logic, 
Tables 4a and 4b report results using one, three and five year lags on the independent 
variables for the Sys-GMM and logit estimations, respectively. A similar exercise would not 
make sense for the CCE-MG results, which already (and only) capture the long-run 
relationship.  
 
Table 4a Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on polity, using different 
lags 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 
Lλ.Polity_s 0.8741*** 0.5991*** 0.5008*** 0.8612*** 0.5904*** 0.4316*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0811) (0.0915) (0.0280) (0.0768) (0.1088) 
Lλ.Tax_Rel 18.0684*** 19.4390** 23.8694**    
 (5.3422) (7.9695) (10.0033)    
Lλ.TotTax    -11.7086 7.0397 22.2667 
    (15.5717) (31.2309) (39.0345) 
Lλ.totnotax    -26.0380*** -39.0786** -35.7187 
    (8.3181) (17.1580) (32.7934) 
Lλ.lgdp -0.8896 0.6934 -1.6613 -1.6612 0.0153 -0.5000 
 (1.2806) (2.0321) (2.4600) (1.3640) (1.9998) (2.6180) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.150 0.316 0.000 0.208 0.436 
AR(2) 0.648 0.470 0.390 0.650 0.420 0.285 
Hansen 0.376 0.228 0.374 0.291 0.181 0.054 
N 2579 2308 2024 2579 2308 2024 
N_g 155.000 155.000 152.000 155.000 155.000 152.000 
Notes: Columns (1), (4) use lags t-1; columns (2), (5) use lags t-3; columns (3), (6) use lags t-5. All regression results based on 
the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-values 
reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-
values for tests of second order autocorrelation. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
The results follow the expected pattern. The Sys-GMM results using tax_rel become 
moderately larger and more significant over longer lag lengths. When we disaggregate 
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tax_rel into its component parts the same is generally true. Tottax is always insignificant, but 
becomes more positive as the lag grows longer, while totnontax become more negative and 
significant moving from a one-year to a three-year lag.  
 
The only incongruous result is a loss of significance on the totnontax variable with a five-year 
lag, along with a sharp increase in the coefficient on tottax. However, both results should be 
discarded, as the Hansen test statistic indicates that the results are econometrically 
unreliable owing to the excessive proliferation of instruments – a common risk in relatively 
complex Sys-GMM specifications.  
 
Table 4b Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on regime, using random 
effects logit model and different lags 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 
Lλ.regime -5.2888 -18.1924*** -25.7939*** -0.6607 -12.5082*** -20.0787*** 
 (3.5544) (3.9408) (4.7138) (2.8037) (3.2157) (3.9071) 
Lλ.Tax_Rel 1.5100 4.4561*** 7.2327***    
 (1.0490) (1.6442) (2.0780)    
Lλ.regimextaxrel 1.9235 2.7075 3.6250    
 (1.8691) (1.9330) (2.2226)    
Lλ.TotTax    -6.2755* -2.3642 7.8482 
    (3.7480) (5.0183) (6.7844) 
Lλ.TotNonTax    -12.5968** -16.4260*** -20.2697*** 
    (5.3654) (5.7189) (6.9277) 
Lλ.regimextottax    16.7894** 12.3545 3.7831 
    (8.1804) (8.1421) (9.8485) 
Lλ.regimextotnontax    8.6665 3.1397 -2.0186 
    (7.4713) (6.4659) (6.9634) 
Aggregate effects in 
democracies 
      
1 + 2 3.4334*** 7.1636*** 10.8576***    
 (1.5399) (2.1194) (2.4668)    
1 + 3    10.5138 9.9903 11.6313 
    (7.2802) (7.6084) (9.1243) 
2 + 4    -3.9303 -13.2862** -22.2882*** 
    (5.1777) (5.7665) (6.8447) 
Random effects 
model descriptors 
      
  .0020783 2.372898 3.583723 .001475 2.110443 3.522656 
  1.31e-06 .631202 .7960776 6.61e-07 .575163 .7904406 
N 2305 2025 1730 2305 2025 1730 
N_g 157.000 156.000 152.000 157.000 156.000 152.000 
Notes: Columns (1), (4) use lags t-1; columns (2), (5) use lags t-3; columns (3), (6) use lags t-5. All regressions include a 
standard set of control variables, which are excluded in order to conserve space: lgdp, civil_war and growthpc. * p<0.10,  
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 1 + 2  captures the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel variables, and thus captures the 
impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1). 1 + 3  similarly captures the joint significance of tottax and 
regime x tottax, while 1 + 3  captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
The results for the logit estimations are similarly consistent with expectations, as our 
explanatory variables universally become larger and more significant as the lag length is 
increased for both autocracies and democracies. Interestingly, with a five-year lag we find 

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evidence that non-tax revenue may increase the likelihood of autocratic transitions in existing 
democracies, though this finding is not robust to employing fixed effects.39  
  
The fact that most of the results become larger and more significant over longer lags is 
consistent with the dynamics of the model, as the one-year effects reported earlier should be 
magnified over multiple years. More notable are the cases where the sign on the results is 
reversed over a longer lag, as is the case for the tottax variable in both models, as this may 
indicate that the longer lags better capture the causal process of interest, as initially 
proposed by Ross (2004).  
 
5.2 Alternative dependent variables 
 
We also test the robustness of our results to employing alternative measures of democracy. 
To begin we run our Sys-GMM and CCE-MG results when employing several other common 
measures: the Democracy measure from the International Country Risk Guide (icrg_dem), 
the Freedom House measure of democracy (fh_dem), and the Accountability measure from 
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (wgi_acc).  
 
Tables 5a and 5b report results using Sys-GMM, employing multiple lag lengths. The 
diagnostic statistics indicate invalid instrument and/or persistent second order autocorrelation 
in several specifications, and whether the results are econometrically valid is signalled in a 
row at the bottom of both tables. The results generally lose significance in these (invalid) 
specifications. By contrast, the tax_rel variable is positive and significant in four of the five 
valid specifications (employing wgi_acc and fh_dem as dependent variables), while falling 
just short of significance in the other. Meanwhile, there are only three valid specifications in 
Table 5b, but the totnontax variable is negative and significant in all of them, while the tottax 
variable is always insignificant. 
 
																																																								
39  Fixed effects results available on request. 
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Table 5a Robustness check using tax_rel and different measures of governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se  b/se 
 ICRG_Dem ICRG_Dem ICRG_Dem WGI_Acc WGI_Acc WGI_Acc Fh_dem Fh_dem Fh_dem 
 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 
Lλ.DV 0.9779*** 0.7356*** 0.4333*** 0.8902*** 0.3752*** 0.2421** 0.8789*** 0.6537*** 0.4538*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0683) (0.0907) (0.0574) (0.1061) (0.1178) (0.0294) (0.0598) (0.0873) 
Lλ.Tax_Rel 1.1614 0.8268 2.0694*** 0.3367** 1.1057*** 1.0033** 0.3488 1.7766*** 1.9167*** 
 (0.8272) (0.6878) (0.7894) (0.1479) (0.2912) (0.4261) (0.2269) (0.4295) (0.6153) 
Lλ.lgdp -0.0525 0.1197 0.3726 -0.0264 -0.0167 0.0874 0.0426 0.1367 0.0229 
 (0.1913) (0.2189) (0.3724) (0.0710) (0.1005) (0.1412) (0.0802) (0.1495) (0.2738) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.862 0.057 0.000 0.786 0.765 
AR(2) 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.007 0.297 0.940 0.993 0.243 0.523 
Hansen 0.030 0.055 0.014 0.036 0.330 0.447 0.389 0.318 0.106 
Econometrically 
valid? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2228 1989 1737 1321 1165 991 2308 2061 1804 
N_g 135.000 135.000 133.000 178.000 178.000 177.000 139.000 139.000 137.000 
Notes: Columns (1), (4), (7) use lags t-1; columns (2), (5), (8) use lags t-3; columns (3), (6), (9) use lags t-5. All regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer 
standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are 
p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014).  
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Table 5b: Robustness check using tottax, totnontax and different measures of governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM 
two-step 
Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM two-
step 
Sys-GMM two-
step 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se  b/se 
 ICRG_Dem ICRG_Dem ICRG_Dem WGI_Acc WGI_Acc WGI_Acc Fh_dem Fh_dem Fh_dem 
 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 λ=1 λ=3 λ=5 
Lλ.DV 0.9813*** 0.7108*** 0.4876*** 0.9404*** 0.5551*** 0.3178** 0.8865*** 0.6595*** 0.5061*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0719) (0.0974) (0.0386) (0.1558) (0.1249) (0.0264) (0.0654) (0.0859) 
Lλ.TotTax -1.5626 -0.8780 1.0686 -0.5508 0.5688 2.7895 -0.0216 3.5516** 2.0160 
 (1.0976) (2.0444) (3.0846) (0.3933) (0.8148) (1.7370) (0.7805) (1.7013) (2.6972) 
Lλ.totnotax -0.8375* -1.2664 -2.0345 -0.1348 -1.5489** -1.1812* -0.6017** -0.7055 -2.5607** 
 (0.4506) (0.9706) (1.3170) (0.1795) (0.6170) (0.6224) (0.2924) (0.7480) (1.0167) 
Lλ.lgdp -0.0077 0.0647 0.0803 0.0135 -0.0591 0.0401 0.0258 -0.0448 0.0197 
 (0.1210) (0.2065) (0.3139) (0.0280) (0.0729) (0.1458) (0.0881) (0.1825) (0.2868) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.548 0.102 0.000 0.588 0.819 
AR(2) 0.000 0.000 0.134 0.003 0.793 0.956 0.956 0.299 0.556 
Hansen 0.038 0.030 0.009 0.050 0.152 0.586 0.410 0.053 0.011 
Econometrically 
Valid? 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
N 2228 1989 1737 1321 1165 991 2308 2061 1804 
N_g 135.000 135.000 133.000 178.000 178.000 177.000 139.000 139.000 137.000 
Notes: Columns (1), (4), (7) use lags t-1; columns (2), (5), (8) use lags t-3; columns (3), (6), (9) use lags t-5. All regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer 
standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are 
p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014).	
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By contrast, we find that the CCE-MG results (not reported in order to conserve space) are 
generally not robust to the alternative governance measures, with only one significant result: 
a negative and significant effect of totnontax on the Freedom House measure of democracy 
(fh_dem). While we view the polity measure as preferable, owing to its greater objectivity and 
completeness, this again is a useful indication of the potential sensitivity of the results.  
 
Finally, we re-run our logit estimations when employing an alternative binary measure of 
regime type (regime_polity_60), constructed by coding countries as democracies if they 
achieve a scaled polity score of 60 out of 100 or above.40 The results reported in Table 5c, 
which employ the random effects specification, are broadly in line with those reported so far, 
though modestly stronger and more consistent. For autocracies, the tax_rel variable is 
positive and significant for one-, three- and five-year lags, while the totnontax variable is 
always negative and significant. Meanwhile, tax_rel, tottax and totnontax are each positive in 
democracies, achieving significance for some, but not all, lag lengths. The significance of the 
tax variables is consistent with previous results, while the positive significance of totnontax 
stands in contrast to the results with regime as the dependent variable, and is a further 
indication of the sensitivity of the results related to the impact of non-tax revenue in 
democracies. 
 
  
																																																								
40  This is equivalent to a score of 2 or above (on a scale -10 to 10) on the polity2 variable as coded in the Polity IV dataset. 
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Table 5c Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on polity_60 using a 
random effects logit model and different lags 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 λ=1 λ=1 λ=3 λ=3 λ=5 λ=5 
Lλ.regime_polity_
60 
-3.4330 -1.9006 -9.6984*** -5.8873** -12.1386*** -5.8773** 
 (2.4541) (1.9198) (2.8713) (2.4150) (3.4365) (2.9226) 
Lλ.Tax_Rel 1.3228*  3.0893**  3.1148**  
 (0.7883)  (1.1998)  (1.4051)  
Lλ.polity60xtaxrel 0.2630  0.4985  3.4687**  
 (1.3299)  (1.4103)  (1.5338)  
Lλ.TotTax  -0.7704  2.3706  5.1719 
  (2.6391)  (4.4601)  (5.8315) 
Lλ.TotNonTax  -6.2807**  -10.9171***  -8.1569* 
  (3.1762)  (3.8958)  (4.1731) 
Lλ.polity60xtottax  6.3995  17.7123***  19.0934*** 
  (4.5516)  (6.1669)  (7.3766) 
Lλ.polity60xtotno
ntax 
 6.3582  11.3208**  2.7649 
  (4.0669)  (4.8610)  (5.0596) 
Aggregate effects 
in democracies 
      
1 + 2 1.5858  3.5878***  6.5835***  
 (1.0715)  (1.3910)  (1.5206)  
1 + 3  5.6291  20.0828***  24.2653*** 
  (3.7123)  (6.0793)  (6.9622) 
2 + 4  0.0774  0.4037  -5.3920 
  (2.5364)  (3.8963)  (4.3862) 
Random effects 
model descriptors 
      
  .0060889 .0039629 2.701151 2.848901 4.108202 4.30622 
  .0000113 4.77e-06 .6892271 .7115695 .8368703 .8493195 
N 2571 2571 2305 2305 2018 2018 
N_g 157.000 157.000 157.000 157.000 156.000 156.000 
Notes: Columns (1), (2) use lags t-1; columns (3), (4) use lags t-3; columns (5), (6) use lags t-5. All regressions include a 
standard set of control variables, which are excluded in order to conserve space: lgdp, civil_war and growthpc.* p<0.10,  
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 1 + 2  captures the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel variables, and thus captures the 
impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1). 1 + 3  similarly captures the joint significance of tottax and 
regime x tottax, while 2 + 4 captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
5.3 Sensitivity to alternative time periods 
 
Our core analysis relies on data from 1990 onwards, during which data is both more 
complete and reliable.41 However, as a robustness check we have experimented with 
extending the analysis year-by-year back to 1980, and the results are generally robust in all 
cases.  
 
When employing the Sys-GMM estimators (reported in Tables A1a and A1b in the Appendix) 
we find a positive coefficient on taxrel for every starting year back to 1982, though the results 
																																																								
41  In 1990 the number of complete country-year observations that can be employed in the analysis is 89 – already 
significantly smaller than the peak of 140 covered in 1998, though the latter includes the availability of data for a large 
number of post-Soviet states following the fall of the Soviet Union. The number of annual observations declines to 76 in 
1985, and to 54 in 1980. Notably, the results are also robust to employing a shorter time series beginning in the mid-
1990s, when the data is most complete. 
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fall slightly short of significance when data is extended back to 1980 and 1981. The negative 
coefficient on totnontax remains significant as early as 1983, but is again slightly short of 
significance for earlier start dates.  
 
The pattern is similar for the CCE-MG results, reported in Tables A1c and A1d: there is a 
positive coefficient on tax_rel for the majority of start dates, while the positive coefficient on 
tottax is robust for every start date. The totnontax variable is somewhat less robust, 
remaining significant for start dates back to 1987, but losing significance (though retaining its 
sign and magnitude) for earlier years. This is all consistent with our earlier results, while the 
modest fall in significance with longer time series may reflect either the importance of having 
relatively complete data or the strengthening of the resource curse over time, as suggested 
by Andersen and Ross (2014).42  
 
When we pursue the same exercise employing the logit model, reported in Tables A1e and 
A1f, we again find that the results are robust to extending the sample back in time. All the 
results become somewhat more significant and larger in magnitude as the time series is 
extended, which is likely explained by the benefits of increasing the number of regime 
transitions in the analysis. Notably, this increased significance with a longer time series 
applies equally to the tottax variable, with the results signalling that increased tax revenue 
reduces the likelihood of transition from autocracy to democracy, but has a positive impact in 
reinforcing democracy in already democratic states. However, as in the earlier results, this 
pattern disappears in the fixed effects results (not reported here), in which tottax is positive 
but insignificant in both autocracies and democracies. 
 
5.4 Sensitivity to sample selection 
 
We likewise explore the sensitivity of our results to excluding particular groups of countries. 
For each of our estimation methods, we begin by excluding the eleven members of OPEC 
from the analysis, as well as adding recently-withdrawn Ecuador and Venezuela to the group 
of excluded countries. We subsequently exclude, in turn, countries from the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), both as defined 
by the World Bank. Both are home to significant resource producers, while the latter has 
undergone major governance changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, we 
also re-estimate our results when excluding OECD countries, and when excluding countries 
with populations below either 250,000 or 1,000,000.  
 
Essentially all the results, reported in Tables A2a through A2i in the Appendix, are fully 
robust to these changes in the sample. In general the results are very modestly weaker when 
we exclude major groups of oil producers, with a handful of coefficients falling just below the 
cut-off for statistical significance at conventional levels. However, these changes are both 
small and in the minority. Meanwhile, the results are almost entirely unchanged when the 
OECD and small countries are excluded, if anything becoming modestly more significant. 
This robustness to the exclusion of OECD countries is particularly important, as it addresses 
concerns that our findings may be driven merely by the correspondence of high levels of 
taxation, low levels of non-tax revenue and high levels of democracy in OECD states. 
 
  
																																																								
42  They argue for a key turning point after 1980, following the two global oil crises and the nationalisation of oil supplies in 
many countries, but it is plausible that the resource curse may also have grown progressively stronger through the 
1980s. 
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5.5 Reliance on central government data only 
 
A key innovation of the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset is to combine data for general 
government for more decentralised states with central government data for more centralised 
countries. As explained earlier, this is an attempt to account for the potentially severe 
underestimation of revenue collection in federal states when relying only on central 
government data, and to expand data coverage. To ensure robustness we also test our 
results using exclusively central government data, reported in Table 6. The results are 
generally robust to this alternative, but the more significant message is that the core results 
across all three estimation models are more significant, larger in magnitude and more in line 
with expectations when employing the joint central and general government dataset. This 
appears to reinforce further the analytical value of relying on higher quality and more 
complete data.
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Table 6 Effect of tax reliance, total tax and total non-tax on regime using Sys-GMM, CCE-MG and RE logit, central government only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Sys-GMM 
CenGen 
CCE-GM 
w/o trend 
CenGen 
Sys-GMM 
Central 
CCE-GM 
w/o trend 
Central 
Sys-GMM 
CenGen 
CCE-GM 
w/o trend 
CenGen 
Sys-GMM 
Central 
CCE-GM 
w/o trend 
Central 
Logit 
CenGen 
Logit 
CenGen 
Logit 
Central 
Logit 
Central 
 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=1 λ=1 λ=1 
Lλ.Tax_Rel 18.0684*** 14.3193** 12.2450** 17.8429     1.6350  1.6217  
 (5.3422) (7.2816) (5.2651) (12.3272)     (1.1342)  (1.0944)  
Lλ.regimextax_rel         3.9285*  2.9702  
         (2.2339)  (2.2010)  
Lλ.TotTax     -11.7086 73.7190** -26.2176* 166.7257  -6.2755*  -5.0117 
     (15.5717) (30.8115) (14.3801) (117.9682)  (3.7480)  (3.6794) 
Lλ.TotNonTax     -26.0380*** -137.2167** -27.5514** -80.0266  -12.5968**  -11.8297** 
     (8.3181) (57.2205) (10.8562) (91.8027)  (5.3654)  (5.4811) 
Lλ.regimextottax          16.7893**  9.0804 
          (8.1803)  (7.4974) 
Lλ.regimextotnont
ax 
         8.6664  -6.3171 
          (7.4712)  (9.7615) 
Aggregate effects in 
democracies 
           
1 + 2         5.5635***  4.5919**  
         (1.9740)  (1.9135)  
1 + 3          10.5138  4.0686 
          (7.2802)  (6.5666) 
2 + 4          -3.9303  -18.1467** 
          (5.1777)  (8.1166) 
Sys-GMM diagnostic statistics            
AR(1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000      
AR(2) 0.648  0.660  0.650  0.668      
Hansen 0.376  0.697  0.291  0.269      
Random effects model descriptors          
          .0009771 .001475 .0007979 .0014336 
          2.90e-07 6.61e-07 1.93e-07 6.25e-07 
N 2579 2682 2502 2582 2579 2674 2502 2578 2175 2305 2255 2255 
N_g 155.000 154.000 148.000 146.000 155.000 152.000 148.000 145.000 150.000 157.000 150.000 150.000 
Notes: Dataset merging central and general government data employed in columns (1), (2), (5), (6), (9) and (10). Dataset using only central government data employed in columns (3), (4), (7), (8), 
(11) and (12).  Sys-GMM and CCE-MG regressions include a control for lgdp, not reported in order to conserve space. Logit regressions include a standard set of controls, not reported here to 
conserve space: lgdp, civil_war and growthpc. All independent variables – polity, tax_rel, tottax and totnontax - are contemporaneous for CCE-MG estimates, and lagged t-1 for GMM and Logit 
estimates. All GMM regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. 1 + 2  captures the joint significance of 
the tax_rel and regime x taxrel variables, and thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1). 1 + 3  similarly captures the joint significance of tottax and 
regime x tottax, while 2 + 4  captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. Source: ICTD GRD (2014).

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5.6 Applying ECM methods 
 
Finally, we conclude our robustness tests by subjecting our new data to the ECM regressions 
favoured by the widely-cited work of Haber and Menaldo (2011). ECM regressions provide 
estimates of both the short-run effect of a change in the independent variable on the 
dependent variable, and the long-run equilibrium relationship between the two. The 
dependent variable in an ECM is the change or difference of the variable of interest, so in our 
case it is the change in Democracy, denoted 
 
∆௡ܦ݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ ൌ ܦ݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௧ െ ܦ݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕି௡. 
 
This gives us the following specification: 
 
∆௡ܦ݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௜,௧
ൌ ߙܦ݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௜,௧ି௡ ൅ ߚ∆	ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁௜,௧ି௡ 	൅ ߛ൫ܦ݁݉݋ܿݎܽܿݕ௜,௧ି௡ െ ߜܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁௜,௧ି௡൯
൅ ௜ܺ,௧ି௡′ ߩ ൅ ݑ௜,௧																																																																																									ሾ5ሿ 
 
where X is a vector of control variables, Democracy is our continuous measure based on the 
polity dataset, and Revenue represents our three distinct revenue variables. The time 
horizon of the short-run effect is defined by n. As explained in the text, the econometric 
drawback of this method relative to the CCE-MG estimator is that it does not allow for 
heterogeneous coefficients or for cross-section dependence. We run these regressions for 
the sake of completeness. 
 
To do so, we first replicate Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) results, to ensure that we are using 
precisely the same specification. We then substitute our comparatively complete panel in 
place of their data on fiscal reliance, which covers only eighteen resource-dependent states. 
The results are reported in Table 7. The differenced independent variables represent the 
short-run effects, while the lagged dependent and independent variables are used to 
calculate the long-run effect, which is also reported in the table. We find that the tax_rel 
variable is positive, but not significant either in the short run or the long run. However, when 
we break it into its component parts we find that non-tax revenue (totnontax) has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on accountability in the long run, though with a smaller 
magnitude than the earlier ECM and Sys-GMM results, while tax revenue (tottax) is 
insignificant. Surprisingly, the significance is reversed in the short run, with non-tax revenue 
insignificant and tax revenue significant and positive. Overall, the results remain consistent 
with the existence of a political resource curse, but also again point to the sensitivity of 
specific findings to changes in specification. 
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Table 7 Replication of Haber and Menaldo's ECM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ECM ECM ECM ECM 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.polity_s -0.2786*** -0.2806*** -0.2778*** -0.2800*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0269) (0.0265) (0.0268) 
L.Fiscal Rel 2.5288 2.9024
 (2.4422) (2.7259)   
D.Fiscal Rel (short-run effect) 5.1847 5.5581
 (4.1515) (4.5820)   
Fiscal_Rel long-run effect 9.0771 
(9.3425) 
10.3429 
(10.4501) 
  
L.tottax   -8.3551 -9.6287 
   (7.6739) (6.9788) 
L.totnontax   -7.0160*** -10.0829*** 
   (2.6306) (3.3987) 
D.tottax (short-run effect)  33.7072*** 35.4939*** 
   (11.2430) (11.9656) 
D.totnontax (short-run effect)  -2.1321 -3.1885 
   (4.4614) (4.9855) 
Tottax long-run effect   -30.0720  
(29.8489) 
-34.3897  
(26.8660) 
Totnontax long-run effect   -25.2522***  
(9.7649) 
-36.0118*** 
(13.2528) 
N 2648 2539 2648 2539 
N_g 158.000 153.000 158.000 153.000 
r2 0.199 0.209 0.203 0.214 
Notes: ECM regressions follow Haber and Menaldo (2011). Interpolation is used for missing data to ensure there are no gaps in 
time series. Regressions use Driscoll–Kraay standard errors. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. LRM standard errors estimated 
using the delta method: −1(b(Fiscal Reliance t − 1)/b(Polity t − 1)). Residuals were tested for non-stationarity. In all 
specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) 
panel unit root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and without trend).* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
 
6  Discussion 
 
Our central purpose has been to re-examine existing tests of the political resource curse 
hypothesis using theoretically more appropriate independent variables which focus on the 
extent of government revenue from tax and non-tax sources. By drawing on the new ICTD 
GRD, and employing several complementary econometric approaches from the literature, 
this paper provides more theoretically and empirically robust tests of the existence and 
extent of the political resource curse. 
 
Overall, we find strong evidence across all the estimation strategies for the existence of a 
political resource curse. Across the vast majority of the tests we find both a statistically 
significant positive relationship between tax reliance and democracy and a statistically 
significant negative relationship between total non-tax revenue and democracy. While one or 
the other variable occasionally falls slightly short of standard thresholds of statistical 
significance, at least one of the two is significant in virtually every model specification and 
robustness test across each of the Sys-GMM, CCE-MG, logit and ECM estimations, with the 
lone exception coming when we add highly incomplete data from 1980 and 1981. Consistent 
with prior arguments by Ross (2004) and Andersen and Ross (2014), the strength of these 
results increases as the length of the lag on the revenue variables increases. The broad 
results are robust to alternative control variables, alternative measures of democracy, the 
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inclusion of additional lags, the extension of the time series, systematically excluding 
particular groups of countries or employing only central government data.  
 
The magnitude of the effects is in every case very substantial, but also intuitively plausible. 
The Sys-GMM and CCE-MG results indicate that over the long term a country with non-tax 
revenue at the level of Nigeria (average of 22 per cent of GDP) is expected to have a 31 to 
43 percentage point lower level of democracy than an otherwise similar country with non-tax 
revenue at the level of Senegal (average of 1.5 per cent of GDP). They further suggest that 
the level of democracy is expected to be 60 per cent to 80 per cent lower – that is, almost at 
the bottom of the polity scale – in cases of extreme resource wealth of 40 per cent of GDP or 
more (e.g. Angola and Bahrain).  
 
The results of the logit regressions are expressed in terms of the likelihood of transitioning to 
or from democracy, but tell a comparable story. The likelihood of a transition to democracy is 
almost three times larger (4.2 per cent vs. 1.6 per cent) in a country with very low levels of 
non-tax revenue, as compared to a country with even 10 per cent of GDP coming from non-
tax sources. While the estimates become more imprecise at higher values of non-tax 
revenue, the results suggest that democratic transitions become almost 90 per cent less 
likely when non-tax revenue shifts from 2 per cent of GDP to 20 per cent of GDP, while 
becoming almost impossible at levels of non-tax revenue on par with Angola, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia or Bahrain. The implication is that recent discoveries of oil in several low-income 
countries pose a significant threat to democracy. 
 
While the results overall offer strong support for the existence of a political resource curse, 
the results also reveal significant sensitivity to changes in econometric estimation strategy 
and model specification. Intuitively, this sensitivity is not surprising: it is difficult to capture 
complex political relationships using cross-country econometric methods, as illustrated most 
vividly in evidence of the sensitivity of results linking income and democracy (Acemoglu et al. 
2008). Highlighting this sensitivity has correspondingly been an explicit goal of this research, 
and underpins our reliance on multiple econometric approaches. 
 
However, the sensitivity of the results also holds potential lessons. The sensitivity of the 
results is most vividly apparent in the weak results when employing the Diff-GMM estimator 
(Table 1a) and, to a lesser extent, the ECM estimator (Table 7). In seeking to explain these 
results a recent review article by Ross (forthcoming) is instructive, as he argues that theories 
of the political resource curse are largely theories about long-term effects in levels (i.e. over 
the long term countries with high levels of resource wealth are likely to be less democratic), 
rather than about year-on-year changes (i.e. increases in resource wealth cause relatively 
immediate declines in democracy, and vice versa). Consistent with this contention, both the 
ECM and Diff-GMM estimators rely on first differences and yield comparatively weak results, 
whereas we find much stronger results employing Sys-GMM, CCE-MG and logit models that 
rely on changes in levels of the explanatory variables. 
 
The more cross-cutting sensitivity of the results relates to the total tax variable, which tends 
towards being positive but ranges from positive significance to negative significance, while 
most often being insignificant, depending on the model and specification. This is true even as 
the tax_rel and totnontax variables remain relatively consistent. The simplest conclusion to 
be drawn is that tax revenue has little consistent impact on levels of democracy. However, an 
equally plausible conclusion based on the data is that the relationship between taxation and 
democracy is complex and non-linear. 
 
The first source of support for such a reading of the evidence lies in the more positive and 
sometimes significant relationship between tottax and democracy using the CCE-MG 
estimator. The obvious econometric explanation for the stronger result on tottax, as 
compared to the Sys-GMM estimates, lies in the fact that the CCE-MG model is not dynamic, 
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and does not attempt to control for reverse causation. As a result, it captures the bi-
directional relationship between tottax and democracy, while it is not constrained by 
assumptions about the dynamic structure of any such relationship. Both are likely important.  
 
Most basically, research elsewhere has suggested a positive impact of democracy on tax 
revenue, which should inflate the coefficient on tottax in the CCE-MG model (Timmons 
2010). Less obviously, recent research suggests that the temporal structure of the 
relationship between taxation and democracy may differ from that implied by the model 
specification employed here, and in the literature more broadly. As initially described by Ross 
(2004), the use of lagged variables in the core specification in part reflects a belief that, if 
taxation is a cause of expanded democracy, it is ‘sensible to [assume] that a change in the 
independent variables (taxes) should precede a change in the dependent variable 
[democracy]’ by the length of the lag (Ross 2004: 238). However, this may be a poor 
description of the empirical reality.  
 
On one hand, any impact of taxation on democracy may occur over the long term, through 
subtle changes in levels of political engagement among increasingly burdened taxpayers. 
Indeed, consistent with this view, the tottax variable becomes positive, though still slightly 
short of positive significance, when a longer lag is employed in the Sys-GMM results. As 
importantly, and as recognised by Ross (2004), even if taxation is the cause of increased 
democracy, changes in democracy may in practice precede changes in taxation – or taxation 
may decline rather than increase prior to increases in democracy. This will be true, for 
example, if a government chooses to first expand democracy in an effort to facilitate 
subsequent tax collection. It will similarly be true if expanded democracy is a response to 
declining tax collection, spurred by successful resistance to taxation by taxpayers (Prichard 
2010). Put more simply, the mixed results for tottax are at least consistent with there being a 
poor fit between the dynamic structure of the model and the actual dynamics of the causal 
processes linking taxation and democracy.  
 
The second indication of a potentially more complex relationship between tax and democracy 
comes from the logit regressions. As a starting point, the fixed effects version of the results, 
though relying on a relatively small sample, suggests a positive impact of tax collection on 
the likelihood of democracy. By contrast, the random effects results reveal no effect of total 
tax collection on the likelihood of democratisation in autocracies. However, the random 
effects results indicate a positive, and often significant, impact of tax collection on the 
likelihood of existing democracies remaining democratic. Taken together, the evidence 
suggests an ambiguous relationship between taxation and democracy in autocracies, but, 
tentatively, a positive impact of taxation on democracy in existing democracies.  
 
Such a conclusion is consistent with theory. Any relationship between taxation and 
democracy rests on the ability of taxpayers to engage in collective action, to resist unpopular 
government taxation and to bargain for reciprocal concessions from governments. There are 
clear reasons to expect these processes to be more likely in democracies, where collective 
action is eased and there are institutionalised spaces for bargaining between citizens and 
governments. While strong conclusions are impossible given the unevenness of the results, 
the logit results echo emerging arguments elsewhere that tax-democracy links are not 
guaranteed, and that context is likely to condition particular outcomes (Prichard 2010). 
 
That said, the logit results also highlight a further risk in interpreting the results on tottax, 
which has been overlooked in earlier results. Simply, while tottax captures the burden of 
taxation on citizens and businesses, it may also be acting as a proxy for broader state 
capacity.43 If this is the case then we would expect tottax to have a positive impact on 
democracy in democracies, as it would be indicative of strong state capacity and stability. 
																																																								
43  Indeed, there is a long tradition of studies employing tax collection as a indicator of state capacity (Lieberman 2002). 
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Likewise, we would expect tottax to have an insignificant or negative impact in autocracies, 
as it would be a signal of the relative strength and institutionalisation of individual autocratic 
governments. The bottom line is, again, that while our results on the tottax variable are 
comparatively mixed, this may be best understood as a reflection of the substantial 
complexity of the relationship. However, these possibilities are merely speculative given the 
sensitivity of the results, and this appears to be an area in which complementary research 
strategies are particularly needed.  
 
 
7  Conclusions 
 
The premise of this paper has been straightforward: despite expanding econometric tests of 
the political resource curse, and growing econometric complexity, these tests have been 
undermined by their reliance on theoretically imperfect explanatory variables, which have in 
turn been driven by the stark weaknesses of cross-country government revenue data. As 
with many areas of development research, the most useful strategy for generating improved 
results thus lies not in more complex methods, or more complex hypotheses, but in 
improving the quality of underlying data, testing more theoretically precise propositions, and 
subjecting the results to a variety of complementary econometric tests.  
 
In doing so we find what we believe to be the most robust existing evidence of a political 
resource curse. We demonstrate, across a range of methods, that the magnitude of these 
effects is large, making the composition of government revenue a highly influential 
determinant of governance outcomes across countries. However, while the broad pattern of 
results is compelling, we also seek explicitly to highlight the sensitivity of these results at the 
margin. This sensitivity is unsurprising, given the obvious challenges of capturing complex 
political relationships through cross-country econometric methods. However, the sensitivity 
also holds an important message: while cross-country data offers valuable insights into the 
broad pattern of relationships, more nuanced claims based on aggregate data are at best 
indicative and should be treated with caution. More in-depth understanding correspondingly 
demands that cross-country results be paired with evidence from alternative, and 
complementary, research strategies. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1a Effect of tax reliance on polity using Sys-GMM and different time periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Sys-GMM 1990 
Sys-GMM 
1989 
Sys-GMM 
1988 
Sys-GMM 
1987 
Sys-GMM 
1986 
Sys-GMM 
1985 
Sys-GMM 
1984 
Sys-GMM 
1983 
Sys-GMM 
1982 
Sys-GMM 
1981 
Sys-GMM 
1980 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.Polity_s 0.8604*** 0.8896*** 0.8964*** 0.9004*** 0.9065*** 0.9219*** 0.9276*** 0.9271*** 0.9297*** 0.9376*** 0.9373*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0290) (0.0220) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0191) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0171) (0.0152) (0.0154) 
L.Tax_Rel 16.9375*** 15.2916*** 14.2645*** 12.0857** 11.5332*** 10.7277** 11.1559** 10.5812* 11.2088*** 7.0901 4.1392 
 (5.7279) (4.4339) (4.3247) (4.7667) (4.3362) (4.8447) (5.3443) (5.4614) (4.2611) (5.6027) (3.8638) 
L.lgdp -0.4163 0.5821 0.4882 0.9248 0.4146 1.0053 -0.2884 0.2135 0.7370 0.7816 0.4201 
 (0.7412) (0.6164) (1.0474) (1.0032) (1.0649) (0.8691) (1.2686) (1.0178) (0.9313) (0.7552) (0.7349) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.637 0.315 0.314 0.308 0.339 0.414 0.383 0.280 0.278 0.273 0.261 
Hansen 0.295 0.542 0.754 0.358 0.104 0.337 0.604 0.112 0.198 0.589 0.505 
N 2579 2662 2747 2827 2904 2980 3047 3112 3176 3234 3286 
N_g 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 
Notes: All regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-values reported for the Hansen 
statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A1b Effect of total tax and non-tax revenue on polity using Sys-GMM and different time periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Sys-GMM 
1990 
Sys-GMM 
1989 
Sys-GMM 
1988 
Sys-GMM 
1987 
Sys-GMM 
1986 
Sys-GMM 
1985 
Sys-GMM 
1984 
Sys-GMM 
1983 
Sys-GMM 
1982 
Sys-GMM 
1981 
Sys-GMM 
1980 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.Polity_s 0.8499*** 0.8497*** 0.8630*** 0.8838*** 0.8921*** 0.8981*** 0.9066*** 0.9090*** 0.9124*** 0.9167*** 0.9225*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0298) (0.0254) (0.0205) (0.0217) (0.0211) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0174) (0.0182) (0.0196) 
L.TotTax -16.3798 -10.2521 -6.8171 -7.5960 -13.5660 -2.6619 -8.2840 -6.8054 -3.1735 -9.9313 -13.0366 
 (12.5232) (13.0362) (11.2002) (9.7204) (11.6538) (12.1827) (10.2273) (10.6147) (10.6738) (11.3914) (12.8338) 
L.totnotax -21.0339*** -15.0837** -16.1040** -13.8625** -14.2562* -10.6663 -11.6652 -11.8753* -7.9345 -10.2843 -9.4276 
 (7.6095) (7.2206) (7.8240) (6.7499) (8.1947) (7.3076) (7.2745) (6.3943) (5.2557) (7.9388) (9.1250) 
L.lgdp -0.4988 0.2019 -0.0575 0.5831 0.9205 1.0370 0.3972 0.7382 0.5957 0.7879 0.7930 
 (0.8171) (0.8823) (1.0595) (0.8255) (1.1198) (1.0051) (1.2532) (0.9780) (0.8923) (1.0283) (0.8083) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.645 0.342 0.307 0.319 0.348 0.394 0.372 0.267 0.265 0.273 0.270 
Hansen 0.264 0.216 0.136 0.517 0.077 0.210 0.377 0.491 0.518 0.102 0.191 
N 2579 2662 2747 2827 2904 2980 3047 3112 3176 3234 3286 
N_g 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 155.000 
Notes: All regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-values reported for the Hansen 
statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A1c Effect of tax reliance on polity using CCE-MG and different time periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 CCE-MG 
1990 
CCE-MG 
1989 
CCE-MG 
1988 
CCE-MG 
1987 
CCE-MG 
1986 
CCE-MG 
1985 
CCE-MG 
1984 
CCE-MG 
1983 
CCE-MG 
1982 
CCE-MG 
1981 
CCE-MG 
1980 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Tax_Rel 14.3193** 13.5314* 11.3142 8.5969 9.2579 10.9711* 12.6872** 13.2134** 13.1117* 11.2743* 9.2019 
 (7.2816) (7.0519) (6.9403) (6.4065) (6.0321) (5.8037) (6.1401) (6.4742) (6.8197) (6.4473) (6.1377) 
lgdp 9.6114* 10.3129** 11.1428** 11.8789** 11.7053** 12.1287** 11.7679** 11.1703** 9.9456* 8.6399* 9.5346** 
 (5.1366) (5.1814) (5.0632) (5.1639) (5.2673) (5.2596) (5.3140) (5.2471) (5.1533) (4.8592) (4.7225) 
N 2682 2768 2853 2933 3010 3086 3153 3218 3282 3340 3392 
N_g 154.000 154.000 154.000 154.000 154.000 154.000 154.000 154.000 154.000 154.000 154.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Residuals of the CCE-MG regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-
stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and without trend). 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014).  
 
 
Table A1d Effect of total tax and non-tax revenue on polity using CCE-MG and different time periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 CCE-MG 
1990 
CCE-MG 
1989 
CCE-MG 
1988 
CCE-MG 
1987 
CCE-MG 
1986 
CCE-MG 
1985 
CCE-MG 
1984 
CCE-MG 
1983 
CCE-MG 
1982 
CCE-MG 
1981 
CCE-MG 
1980 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
TotTax 73.7190** 81.0666*** 79.8498*** 63.1868** 57.0215** 60.1626** 64.8290** 55.8214** 52.9791** 44.7606* 43.8241* 
 (30.8115) (28.5882) (26.6159) (25.6068) (24.3854) (25.0955) (25.4202) (25.4878) (25.5259) (25.3493) (25.4999) 
totnotax -137.2164** -129.8983** -111.6711** -92.7440* -83.1549 -81.0482 -76.1173 -78.8728 -80.8322 -78.2299 -70.3315 
 (57.2204) (55.7169) (54.5496) (52.5431) (52.1920) (51.9147) (52.2718) (49.8624) (49.5681) (50.2689) (49.5853) 
lgdp 10.7081* 7.0621 8.1764 10.2727* 12.0286** 11.9873** 11.2816** 11.3928** 9.9653** 9.6076** 10.3746** 
 (6.4542) (5.5665) (5.3372) (5.2728) (5.0786) (5.0486) (5.0455) (4.9173) (4.8519) (4.7264) (4.6133) 
N 2674 2760 2845 2925 3002 3078 3145 3210 3274 3332 3384 
N_g 152.000 152.000 152.000 152.000 152.000 152.000 152.000 152.000 152.000 152.000 152.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Residuals of the CCE-MG regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-
stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and without trend).  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A1e Effect of tax reliance on regime using random effects logit and different time periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Logit 1990 Logit 1989 Logit 1988 Logit 1987 Logit 1986 Logit 1985 Logit 1984 Logit 1983 Logit 1982 Logit 1981 Logit 1980 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.regime -5.8295* -4.7503 -5.4258* -4.6072 -4.2589 -4.3057 -4.4396 -4.0695 -4.0695 -4.0695 -4.0688 
 (3.4134) (3.2288) (3.1917) (3.1318) (3.1083) (3.0804) (3.0976) (3.0943) (3.0943) (3.0943) (3.1179) 
L.Tax_Rel 1.4456 1.4285 1.3852 1.5599* 1.5749* 1.6176* 1.7938** 1.9286** 1.9286** 1.9286** 1.9338** 
 (0.9997) (0.9552) (0.9232) (0.9121) (0.9143) (0.8986) (0.8987) (0.8980) (0.8980) (0.8980) (0.8977) 
L.regimextaxrel 1.5535 1.0018 1.2196 0.9869 0.9862 0.9363 0.5851 0.4587 0.4587 0.4587 0.4429 
 (1.8058) (1.7950) (1.7441) (1.7445) (1.7533) (1.7489) (1.7589) (1.7580) (1.7580) (1.7580) (1.7560) 
L.lgdp -0.2798 -0.2658 -0.2271 -0.1607 -0.1481 -0.1569 -0.1168 -0.0710 -0.0710 -0.0710 -0.0632 
 (0.2024) (0.1923) (0.1860) (0.1800) (0.1797) (0.1753) (0.1720) (0.1691) (0.1691) (0.1691) (0.1688) 
L.regimexlgdp 1.6316*** 1.5256*** 1.5873*** 1.5060*** 1.4724*** 1.4859*** 1.5345*** 1.5006*** 1.5006*** 1.5006*** 1.5087*** 
 (0.3644) (0.3371) (0.3367) (0.3291) (0.3253) (0.3224) (0.3233) (0.3224) (0.3224) (0.3224) (0.3261) 
Aggregate effect 
in democracies 
           
1 + 2 2.9991** 2.4302 2.6047* 2.5467* 2.5611* 2.5538* 2.3789 2.3873 2.3873 2.3873 2.3767 
 (1.4984) (1.5156) (1.4757) (1.4838) (1.4926) (1.4973) 1.5094 (1.5086) (1.5086) (1.5086) (1.5071) 
Random effects 
model descriptors 
           
  .0010165 .0022275 .0020144 .0021315 .0011413 .001588 .0019006 .0018612 .0018612 .0018612 .0024203 
  3.14e-07 1.51e-06 1.23e-06 1.38e-06 3.96e-07 7.67e-07 1.10e-06 1.05e-06 1.05e-06 1.05e-06 1.78e-06 
N 2675 2771 2866 2955 3042 3127 3203 3276 3276 3276 3328 
N_g 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 1 + 2  captures the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel  variables, and thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. 
when regime = 1).  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A1f Effects of total tax and total non-tax on regime using random effects logit and different time periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Logit 1990 Logit 1989 Logit 1988 Logit 1987 Logit 1986 Logit 1985 Logit 1984 Logit 1983 Logit 1982 Logit 1981 Logit 1980 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
L.regime -1.5338 -0.7722 -1.2884 -0.6758 -0.3395 -0.2936 -0.6770 -0.4559 -0.4559 -0.4559 -0.4669 
 (2.7011) (2.5709) (2.5134) (2.4754) (2.4505) (2.4288) (2.4123) (2.4020) (2.4020) (2.4020) (2.4196) 
L.TotTax -5.2028 -5.1182 -4.8903 -4.9707 -5.0682* -6.1969** -6.4802** -5.8654** -5.8654** -5.8654** -5.9108** 
 (3.5678) (3.3197) (3.1534) (3.0598) (3.0670) (3.0806) (3.0451) (2.9536) (2.9536) (2.9536) (2.9601) 
L.TotNonTax -10.3526** -10.4235** -10.1350** -11.0946*** -11.2291*** -12.1784*** -13.1596*** -13.4167*** -13.4167*** -13.4167*** -13.4987*** 
 (4.6311) (4.4202) (4.1837) (4.2187) (4.2315) (4.2497) (4.3307) (4.3382) (4.3382) (4.3382) (4.3439) 
L.regimextottax 15.4740** 18.5316** 18.7130** 18.6609*** 18.9726*** 20.2246*** 20.3023*** 19.7911*** 19.7911*** 19.7911*** 19.7624*** 
 (7.5928) (7.4198) (7.2735) (7.1952) (7.1787) (7.1663) (7.0444) (7.0122) (7.0122) (7.0122) (7.0173) 
L.regimextotnontax 7.7160 9.2527 8.8476 9.8079 9.9148 10.8771* 12.0088* 12.2649* 12.2649* 12.2649* 12.2755* 
 (6.4349) (6.6052) (6.3560) (6.3947) (6.4129) (6.4366) (6.5225) (6.5057) (6.5057) (6.5057) (6.4797) 
L.lgdp 0.0484 0.0590 0.0846 0.1621 0.1774 0.2109 0.2657 0.2965 0.2965 0.2965 0.3065 
 (0.2466) (0.2310) (0.2195) (0.2131) (0.2126) (0.2072) (0.2036) (0.2009) (0.2009) (0.2009) (0.2004) 
L.regimexlgdp 0.9008** 0.7254* 0.7873** 0.7044* 0.6653* 0.6348* 0.6731* 0.6527* 0.6527* 0.6527* 0.6611* 
 (0.4269) (0.4040) (0.3946) (0.3892) (0.3855) (0.3816) (0.3799) (0.3775) (0.3775) (0.3775) (0.3792) 
Aggregate effects in 
democracies 
           
1 + 3 10.2711 13.4134** 13.8227** 13.6902** 13.9043** 14.0277** 13.8221** 13.9256** 13.9256** 13.9256** 13.8516** 
 (6.7310) (6.6672) (6.5872) (6.5406) (6.5183) (6.5024) (6.3833) (6.3867) (6.3867) (6.3867) (6.3874) 
2 + 4 -2.6366 -1.1707 -1.2874 -1.2867 -1.3142 -1.3013 -1.1508 -1.1517 -1.1517 -1.1517 -1.2231 
 (4.4721) (4.9074) (4.7838) (4.8043) (4.8161) (4.8333) (4.8756) (4.8441) (4.8441) (4.8441) (4.8042) 
Random effects 
model descriptors
           
  .0015408 .0010409 .0020486 .0025107 .0011372 .0016216 .001968 .0027575 .0027575 .0027575 .0024587 
  7.22e-07 3.29e-07 1.28e-06 1.92e-06 3.93e-07 7.99e-07 1.18e-06 2.31e-06 2.31e-06 2.31e-06 1.84e-06 
N 2675 2771 2866 2955 3042 3127 3203 3276 3276 3276 3328 
N_g 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 178.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 1 + 3  captures the joint significance of the tottax and regime x tottax variables, and thus captures the impact of tottax on regime in democracies (e.g. when 
regime = 1). 2 + 4 similarly captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A2a Effect of revenue variables on polity, Sys-GMM and CCE-MG, excluding OPEC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Sys-GMM  
No OPEC 
CCE-MG  
No OPEC 
Sys-GMM  
No OPEC 
CCE-MG  
No OPEC 
Sys-GMM  
No OPEC2 
CCE-MG 
 No OPEC2 
Sys-GMM  
No OPEC2 
CCE-MG 
 No OPEC2 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 
L1.Polity_s 0.8483***  0.8493***  0.8466***  0.8459***  
 (0.0396)  (0.0311)  (0.0399)  (0.0306)  
Lλ.Tax_Rel 14.1709*** 10.7858   14.2054*** 11.7948   
 (5.3115) (7.5098)   (5.4848) (7.5640)   
Lλ.TotTax   -10.6448 29.4464   -10.9488 41.5375 
   (13.8054) (25.6993)   (14.0105) (33.6230) 
Lλ.totnotax   -45.7684*** -129.1017**   -45.5146*** -132.9616** 
   (12.7652) (57.4292)   (12.8236) (58.6307) 
AR(1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
AR(2) 0.653  0.676  0.664  0.686  
Hansen 0.314  0.197  0.356  0.230  
N 2381 2476 2381 2468 2348 2442 2348 2434 
N_g 144.000 143.000 144.000 141.000 142.000 141.000 142.000 139.000 
Notes: Regressions include a control for lgdp, not reported in order to conserve space.  All independent variables - polity, tax_rel, tottax and totnontax - are contemporaneous for CCE-MG estimates, 
and lagged t-1 for GMM estimates. All GMM regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-
values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. Residuals of the 
CCE-MG regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit 
root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and without trend).  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A2b Effect of revenue variables on polity, Sys-GMM and CCE-MG, excluding MENA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sys-GMM No MENA CCE-MG No MENA Sys-GMM No MENA CCE-MG No MENA 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 
L1.Polity_s 0.8511***  0.8500***  
 (0.0420)  (0.0374)  
Lλ.Tax_Rel 16.0808*** 12.2552   
 (5.8897) (7.6781)   
Lλ.TotTax   -14.7182 81.9161** 
   (17.5481) (34.0554) 
Lλ.totnotax   -20.3807* -148.3973** 
   (11.2403) (61.6052) 
AR(1) 0.000  0.000  
AR(2) 0.603  0.635  
Hansen 0.225  0.116  
N 2387 2482 2387 2474 
N_g 144.000 143.000 144.000 141.000 
Notes: Regressions include a control for lgdp, not reported in order to conserve space.  All independent variables - polity, tax_rel, tottax and totnontax - are contemporaneous for CCE-MG estimates, 
and lagged t-1 for GMM estimates. All GMM regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-
values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. Residuals of the 
CCE-MG regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit 
root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and without trend).  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A2c Effect of revenue variables on polity, Sys-GMM and CCE-MG, excluding EECA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sys-GMM No CECA CCE-MG No CECA Sys-GMM No CECA CCE-MG No CECA 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 
L1.Polity_s 0.8687***  0.8434***  
 (0.0317)  (0.0292)  
Lλ.Tax_Rel 16.9828*** 16.6450*   
 (5.3436) (9.9554)   
Lλ.TotTax   -24.2689 22.7024 
   (16.9798) (39.1279) 
Lλ.totnotax   -18.2430** -83.4526 
   (8.4942) (70.8292) 
AR(1) 0.000  0.000  
AR(2) 0.752  0.753  
Hansen 0.326  0.460  
N 2338 2428 2338 2428 
N_g 133.000 133.000 133.000 133.000 
Notes: Regressions include a control for lgdp, not reported in order to conserve space.  All independent variables - polity, tax_rel, tottax and totnontax - are contemporaneous for CCE-MG estimates, 
and lagged t-1 for GMM estimates. All GMM regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-
values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. Residuals of the 
CCE-MG regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit 
root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and without trend).  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A2d Effect of revenue variables on polity, Sys-GMM and CCE-MG, excluding OECD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Sys-GMM No OECD CCE-MG No OECD Sys-GMM No OECD CCE-MG No OECD 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 
L1.Polity_s 0.8700***  0.8553***  
 (0.0394)  (0.0262)  
Lλ.Tax_Rel 20.5571*** 29.2320***   
 (5.3783) (9.6204)   
Lλ.TotTax   -9.0870 48.3573 
   (15.6977) (40.5882) 
Lλ.totnotax   -26.3057*** -229.8694*** 
   (9.0503) (77.5813) 
AR(1) 0.000  0.000  
AR(2) 0.652  0.665  
Hansen 0.318  0.483  
N 2090 2181 2090 2173 
N_g 127.000 126.000 127.000 124.000 
Notes: Regressions include a control for lgdp, not reported in order to conserve space.  All independent variables - polity, tax_rel, tottax and totnontax - are contemporaneous for CCE-MG estimates, 
and lagged t-1 for GMM estimates. All GMM regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-
values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. Residuals of the 
CCE-MG regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-stationarity at the 1% level (with and without trend). The 
Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test fails to reject non-stationarity when a trend is included; without trend, it fails to reject in regression 2 but does reject in regression 4. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A2e Effect of revenue variables on polity, Sys-GMM and CCE-MG, excluding small countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Sys-GMM No 
<250000 
CCE-MG No 
<250000 
Sys-GMM No 
<250000 
CCE-MG No 
<250000 
Sys-GMM No 
<1000000 
CCE-MG No 
<1000000 
Sys-GMM No 
<1000000 
CCE-MG No 
<1000000 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 λ=1 λ=0 
L1.Polity_s 0.8741***  0.8612***  0.8576***  0.8438***  
 (0.0359)  (0.0280)  (0.0336)  (0.0295)  
Lλ.Tax_Rel 18.0684*** 14.3193**   21.2386*** 12.5025*   
 (5.3422) (7.2816)   (5.6642) (7.3414)   
Lλ.TotTax   -11.7086 73.7190**   -21.2869 83.1988** 
   (15.5717) (30.8115)   (15.4780) (33.7848) 
Lλ.totnotax   -26.0380*** -137.2164**   -30.8082*** -157.6456** 
   (8.3181) (57.2204)   (9.7561) (67.2014) 
AR(1) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
AR(2) 0.648  0.650  0.596  0.596  
Hansen 0.376  0.291  0.363  0.527  
N 2579 2682 2579 2674 2361 2455 2361 2443 
N_g 155.000 154.000 155.000 152.000 145.000 143.000 145.000 140.000 
Notes: Regressions include a control for lgdp, not reported in order to conserve space.  All independent variables - polity, tax_rel, tottax and totnontax - are contemporaneous for CCE-MG estimates, 
and lagged t-1 for GMM estimates. All GMM regression results based on the two-step system-GMM procedure. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The p-
values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. Residuals of the 
CCE-MG regressions were tested for non-stationarity. In all specifications the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test rejects non-stationarity at the 1% level, while the Pesaran (2007) panel unit 
root test fails to reject non-stationarity (in both cases, with and without trend).  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A2f Effect of revenue variables on regime, using logit, excluding OPEC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Logit No OPEC Logit No OPEC Logit No OPEC Logit No OPEC Logit No OPEC2 Logit No OPEC2 Logit No OPEC2 Logit No OPEC2 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
   With controls With controls   With controls With controls 
L.regime -7.2744* -0.9191 -7.7908* -1.0720 -7.5696* -1.9989 -8.4578* -2.4226 
 (3.8054) (2.7934) (4.2103) (3.1391) (4.0059) (2.9379) (4.4283) (3.3167) 
L.Tax_Rel 1.3143  1.4803  1.3945  1.5931  
 (1.1005)  (1.1717)  (1.1403)  (1.2206)  
L.regimextaxrel 3.2727  4.6463*  2.8918  4.4091*  
 (2.1138)  (2.4115)  (2.2546)  (2.5784)  
L.TotTax  -5.5983  -6.3885*  -5.0279  -5.8185 
  (3.6842)  (3.8472)  (3.7156)  (3.8972) 
L.TotNonTax  -9.8828*  -13.0402**  -9.6241*  -13.0944** 
  (5.0990)  (6.1668)  (5.2685)  (6.4451) 
L.regimextottax  18.6729**  20.1703**  15.1396*  17.1873* 
  (8.1128)  (8.4754)  (8.3462)  (8.7702) 
L.regimextotnontax  4.2387  -4.6449  4.1585  -5.5789 
  (6.6050)  (10.8004)  (6.8609)  (11.1864) 
Aggregate effects in 
democracies 
        
1 + 2 4.5870**  6.1266***  4.2863**  6.0021***  
 (1.8038)  (2.1060)  (1.9445)  (2.2702)  
1 + 3  13.0745*  13.7817*  10.1117  11.36885 
  (7.2565)  (7.5704)  (7.5069)  (7.8881) 
2 + 4  -5.6440  -17.6851**  -5.4655  -18.6733** 
  (4.2175)  (8.8605)  (4.4114)  (9.1392) 
Random effects 
model descriptors
        
  .0015209 .0011511 .0009669 .0014001 .0008446 .0015209 .0009849 .0014303 
  7.03e-07 4.03e-07 2.84e-07 5.96e-07 2.17e-07 7.03e-07 2.95e-07 6.22e-07 
N 2497 2497 2153 2153 2468 2468 2124 2124 
N_g 167.000 167.000 146.000 146.000 165.000 165.000 144.000 144.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Regressions in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) include a standard set of controls, not reported here to conserve space: lgdp, civil_war and growthpc. 1 + 2  
captures the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel  variables, and thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1).  1 + 3  similarly captures the 
joint significance of tottax and regime x tottax, while 2 + 4  captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. Source: ICTD GRD (2014).  
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Table A2g Effect of revenue variables on regime, using logit, excluding MENA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Logit no MENA Logit no MENA Logit no MENA Logit no MENA 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
   With controls With controls 
L.regime -7.2744* -0.9191 -7.7908* -1.0720 
 (3.8054) (2.7934) (4.2103) (3.1391) 
L.Tax_Rel 1.3143  1.4803  
 (1.1005)  (1.1717)  
L.regimextaxrel 3.2727  4.6463*  
 (2.1138)  (2.4115)  
L.TotTax  -5.5983  -6.3885* 
  (3.6842)  (3.8472) 
L.TotNonTax  -9.8828*  -13.0402** 
  (5.0990)  (6.1668) 
L.regimextottax  18.6729**  20.1703** 
  (8.1128)  (8.4754) 
L.regimextotnontax  4.2387  -4.6449 
  (6.6050)  (10.8004) 
Aggregate effects in democracies     
1 + 2 2.8625*  3.3315**  
 (1.4941)  (1.5256)  
1 + 3  9.7673  10.2372 
  (6.7117)  (7.1954) 
2 + 4  -2.3959  -3.6501 
  (4.4581)  (5.1376) 
Random effects model descriptors     
  .0010094 .0015342 .0010014 .0014558 
  3.10e-07 7.15e-07 3.05e-07 6.44e-07 
N 2497 2497 2153 2153 
N_g 167.000 167.000 146.000 146.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Regressions in columns (3) and (4) include a standard set of controls, not reported here to conserve space: lgdp, civil_war and growthpc. 1 + 2  captures 
the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel  variables, and thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1).  1 + 3  similarly captures the joint 
significance of tottax and regime x tottax, while 2 + 4  captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A2h Effect of revenue variables on regime, using logit, excluding OECD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Logit no OECD Logit no OECD Logit no OECD Logit no OECD 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
   With controls With controls 
L.regime -7.2744* -0.9191 -7.7908* -1.0720 
 (3.8054) (2.7934) (4.2103) (3.1391) 
L.Tax_Rel 1.3143  1.4803  
 (1.1005)  (1.1717)  
L.regimextaxrel 3.2727  4.6463*  
 (2.1138)  (2.4115)  
L.TotTax  -5.5983  -6.3885* 
  (3.6842)  (3.8472) 
L.TotNonTax  -9.8828*  -13.0402** 
  (5.0990)  (6.1668) 
L.regimextottax  18.6729**  20.1703** 
  (8.1128)  (8.4754) 
L.regimextotnontax  4.2387  -4.6449 
  (6.6050)  (10.8004) 
Aggregate effects in democracies     
1 + 2 2.7528*  3.1577**  
 (1.5275)  (1.5875)  
1 + 3  8.9744  9.0302 
  (6.9314)  (7.5290) 
2 + 4  -2.4845  -3.8494 
  (4.4798)  (5.2523) 
Random effects model descriptors     
  .0015918 .00152 .0009886 .0014122 
  7.70e-07 7.02e-07 2.97e-07 6.06e-07 
N 2497 2497 2153 2153 
N_g 167.000 167.000 146.000 146.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Regressions in columns (3) and (4) include a standard set of controls, not reported here to conserve space: lgdp, civil_war and growthpc. 1 + 2  captures 
the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel  variables, and thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1).  1 + 3  similarly captures the joint 
significance of tottax and regime x tottax, while 2 + 4  captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Table A2i Effect of revenue variables on regime, using logit, excluding small countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Logit No 
<250000 
Logit No 
<250000 
Logit No 
<250000 
Logit No 
<250000 
Logit No 
<1000000 
Logit No 
<1000000 
Logit No 
<1000000 
Logit No 
<1000000 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
   With controls With controls   With controls With controls 
L.regime -7.2744* -0.9191 -7.7908* -1.0720 -7.5696* -1.9989 -8.4578* -2.4226 
 (3.8054) (2.7934) (4.2103) (3.1391) (4.0059) (2.9379) (4.4283) (3.3167) 
L.Tax_Rel 1.3143  1.4803  1.3945  1.5931  
 (1.1005)  (1.1717)  (1.1403)  (1.2206)  
L.regimextaxrel 3.2727  4.6463*  2.8918  4.4091*  
 (2.1138)  (2.4115)  (2.2546)  (2.5784)  
L.TotTax  -5.5983  -6.3885*  -5.0279  -5.8185 
  (3.6842)  (3.8472)  (3.7156)  (3.8972) 
L.TotNonTax  -9.8828*  -13.0402**  -9.6241*  -13.0944** 
  (5.0990)  (6.1668)  (5.2685)  (6.4451) 
L.regimextottax  18.6729**  20.1703**  15.1396*  17.1873* 
  (8.1128)  (8.4754)  (8.3462)  (8.7702) 
L.regimextotnontax  4.2387  -4.6449  4.1585  -5.5789 
  (6.6050)  (10.8004)  (6.8609)  (11.1864) 
Aggregate effects in 
democracies 
        
1 + 2 3.3003**  3.4981**  3.6935**  4.0201**  
 (1.4913)  (1.5300)  1.5291  (1.5856)  
1 + 3  10.4555  10.9750  16.2215**  18.2476** 
  (6.9786)  (7.1910)  (8.2932)  (8.9674) 
2 + 4  -3.5371  -3.8580  -2.7869  -3.0934 
  (4.9678)  (5.1795)  (5.1249)  (5.3670) 
Random effects 
model descriptors
        
  .0021619 .0015575 .0020911 .001483 .0024077 .0016506 .0020194 .0015594 
  1.42e-06 7.37e-07 1.33e-06 6.69e-07 1.76e-06 8.28e-07 1.24e-06 7.39e-07 
N 2497 2497 2153 2153 2468 2468 2124 2124 
N_g 167.000 167.000 146.000 146.000 165.000 165.000 144.000 144.000 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  Regressions in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) include a standard set of controls, not reported here to conserve space: lgdp, civil_war and growthpc. 1 + 2  
captures the joint significance of the tax_rel and regime x taxrel  variables, and thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies (e.g. when regime = 1).  1 + 3  similarly captures the 
joint significance of tottax and regime x tottax, while 2 + 4  captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax. Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 

	 60
References 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. and Yared, P. (2008) ‘Income and Democracy’, 
American Economic Review, 98(3): 808-842 
 
Alexeev, M. and R. Conrad (2009) ‘The Elusive Curse of Oil’, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 91(3): 586-598 
 
Andersen, J. and Aslaksen, S. (2013) ‘Oil and Political Survival’, Journal of Development 
Studies 100: 89-106 
 
—— and Ross, M. (2014) ‘The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo 
Analysis’, Comparative Political Studies 47: 993-1021 
 
Aslaksen, S. (2010) ‘Oil and Democracy: More than a Cross-Country Correlation?’, Journal 
of Peace Research 47(4): 421-431 
 
Baskaran, T. and Bigsten, A. (2013) ‘Fiscal Capacity and the Quality of Government in Sub-
Saharan Africa’, World Development 45(C): 92-107 
 
Bird, R. (2011) ‘Subnational Taxation in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature,’ 
Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy 2(1): 139-161 
 
Birdsall, N. (2007) Do No Harm: Aid, Weak Institutions, and the Missing Middle in Africa, 
Center for Global Development Working Paper 113, Washington DC: Center for Global 
Development 
 
Bond, S. (2002) Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice, 
Working Paper 09/02, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies 
 
Bornhorst, F., Gupta, S., and Thornton, J. (2008) Natural Resource Endowments, 
Governance and the Domestic Revenue Effort: Evidence from a Panel of Countries, 
IMF Working Paper WP/08/170, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
Brunnschweiler, C. and Bulte, E. (2008) ‘The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of 
paradoxes and red herrings’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
55(3): 248-264 
 
Cavalcanti, T., Mohaddes, K. and Raissi, M. (2011) ‘Growth, Development and Natural 
Resources: New Evidence using a Heterogeneous Panel Analysis’, The Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance 51(4): 305-18 
 
Cheibub, J., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J. (2010) ‘Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited’, 
Public Choice 143(1-2): 67-101 
 
Collier, P. (2006) ‘Is Aid Oil? An Analysis of Whether Africa Can Absorb More Aid’, World 
Development 34(9): 1482-1497 
 
Dunning, T. (2008) Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Eberhardt, M. and Teal, F. (2013) ’Structural Change and Cross-Country Growth Empirics’, 
World Bank Economic Review 27(2): 229-271 
 
	 61
Fayad, G., Bates, R. and Hoeffler, A. (2011) Income and Democracy: Lipset’s Law Inverted, 
OxCarre Research Paper 61 
 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2013, retrieved 8 November 2013, 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org> 
 
Gupta, A. (2007) Determinants of Tax Revenue Efforts in Developing Countries, IMF 
Working Paper 07/184, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund  
 
Haber, S. and Menaldo, V. (2011) ‘Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A 
Reappraisal of the Resource Curse’, American Political Science Review 105(1): 1-26 
 
Hausman, J. (1978) ‘Specification Tests in Econometrics’, Econometrica 46(6): 1251-1271 
 
—— and McFadden, D. (1984) ‘Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model’, 
Econometrica 52(5): 1219-1240 
 
Herb, M. (2005) ‘No Representation Without Taxation? Rents, Development and 
Democracy’, Comparative Politics 37(3): 297-316 
 
Holly, S., Pesaran, M.H. and Yamagata, T. (2010) ‘A Spatio-Temporal Model of House 
Prices in the US,’ Journal of Econometrics 158(1): 160-73 
 
Humphreys, M. (2005) ‘Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution’, The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49(4): 508-537 
 
ICTD (2014) International Centre for Tax and Development Government Revenue Dataset, 
Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development 
 
IMF, Article IV Staff Reports, <http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=51> 
 
IMF, Government Finance Statistics, <http://elibrary-
data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=170809> 
 
IMF, World Economic Outlook, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx> 
 
Jensen, N. and Wantchekon, L. (2004) ‘Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa’, 
Comparative Political Studies 37(7): 816-841 
 
Jerven, M. (2013) ‘Comparability of GDP Estimates in sub-Saharan Africa: The Effect of 
Revisions in Sources and Methods since Structural Adjustment’, Review of Income and 
Wealth, 59(S1): S16-S36 
 
Levi, M. (1988) Of Rule and Revenue, Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
Lieberman, E. (2002) ‘Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: Possibilities 
and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research’, Studies in Comparative International 
Development 36(4): 89-115 
 
Maddala, G. and Wu, S. (1999) ‘A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data 
and a Simple New Test’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61(S1): 631–652 
 
Marshall, M., Jaggers, K., and Gurr, T. (2012) Political regime characteristics and transitions, 
1800-2008, Polity IV Project, Fairfax County: Center for Systemic Peace 
	 62
 
Mehlum, H., Moene, K. and Torvik, R. (2006) ‘Institutions and the Resource Curse’, The 
Economic Journal, 116: 1-20 
 
Moore, B. (1966) The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World, Boston: Beacon 
 
Moore, M. (1998) ‘Death Without Taxes: Democracy, State Capacity and Aid Dependence in 
the Fourth World’, in M. Robinson and G. White (eds), The Democratic Developmental 
State: Politics and Institutional Design Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Morrison, K. (2009) ‘Oil, Nontax Revenue and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime 
Stability’, International Organization 63(1): 107-138  
 
Morrissey, O., Prichard, W. and Torrance, S. (2014) Aid and Taxation: Exploring the 
Relationship Using New Data, ICTD Working Paper 21, Brighton: International Centre 
for Tax and Development 
 
Nickell, S. (1981) ‘Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects’, Econometrica 49: 1417-
1426 
 
Pesaran, M.H. (2007) ‘A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Presence of Cross-Section 
Dependence’, Journal of Applied Econometrics 22(2): 265-312 
 
—— (2006) ‘Estimation and Inference in Large Heterogeneous Panels With a Multifactor 
Error Structure’, Econometrica 74(4): 967-1012 
 
—— and Smith, R. (1995) ‘Estimating Long-Run Relationships From Dynamic 
Heterogeneous Panels’, Journal of Econometrics 68(1): 79-113 
 
Prichard, W. (2010) Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
(DPhil), Brighton: University of Sussex  
 
—— Cobham, A. and Goodall, A. (2014) The ICTD Government Revenue Dataset, ICTD 
Working Paper 19, Brighton: International Centre for Tax and Development 
 
PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide, <https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-
methodologies/icrg> 
 
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. and Limongi, F. (2000) Democracy and 
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
Ramsay, K. (2011) ‘Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil and 
Democracy’, International Organization 65(3): 507-529 
 
Roodman, D. (2009) ‘A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments’, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics 71(1): 135-158  
 
—— (2006) How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to ‘Difference’ and ‘System’ GMM in Stata, 
Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 103, Washington DC: Center 
for Global Development 
 
Ross, M. (forthcoming) ‘What Have We Learned About the Resource Curse?’, Annual 
Review of Political Science 
	 63
 
—— (2012) The Oil Curse:  How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
—— (2004) ‘Does Taxation Lead to Representation?’, British Journal of Political Science 34: 
229-249 
 
—— (2001) ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’, World Politics 53: 325-361 
 
Smith, B. (2004) ‘Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-99’, 
American Journal of Political Science 48(2): 232-246 
 
Timmons, J. (2010) ‘Taxation and Representation in Recent History’, The Journal of Politics 
72(1): 191-208 
 
Tsui, K. (2010) ‘More Oil, Less Democracy? Theory and Evidence from Crude Oil 
Discoveries’, Economic Journal 121(551): 89-115 
 
UCDP/PRIO, Armed Conflict Dataset, 
<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/> 
 
Ulfelder, J. (2007) ‘Natural Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy’, Comparative 
Political Studies 40(8): 995-1018  
 
van der Ploeg, F. (2011) ‘Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?’, Journal of Economic 
Literature 49(2): 366-420 
 
Vijverberg, W. (2011) Testing for IIA with the Hausman-McFadden Test, IZA Discussion 
Paper No.5826, Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor Law 
 
Wantchekon, L. (2002) ‘Why Do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian 
Governments?’, Journal of African Finance and Economic Development 2: 57-77 
 
Wiens, D., Poast, P. and Clark, W. (forthcoming) ‘The Political Resource Curse: An Empirical 
Re-Evaluation’, Political Research Quarterly, Doi: 10.1177/1065912914543836  
 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators> 
 
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home> 
 
Wright, J., Frantz, E. and Geddes, B. (2013) ‘Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival’, British 
Journal of Political Science: 1-20 
 
International Centre for Tax and Development
at the Institute of Development Studies
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
T: +44 (0)1273 606261
F: +44 (0)1273 621202
E:  info@ictd.ac
www.ictd.ac
